

THE
REFORM PROPOSALS

FULL TEXT OF
LORD MORLEY'S DESPATCH
GOVT. OF INDIA'S DESPATCH

SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS BY

LORD MORLEY
LORD LANSDOWNE
LORD MACDONNELL

MR. BUCHANAN'S SPEECH IN THE COMMONS

WITH THE

HON. MR. GOKHALE'S NOTE TO LORD MORLEY
AND HIS SPEECH AT THE MADRAS CONGRESS

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LORD MORLEY'S DESPATCH

ON

THE REFORM PROPOSALS.

The following is the full text of Lord Morley's Despatch:—

I have to acknowledge the important despatch of the 1st October, 1908, in which I had submitted for approval and decision a group of constitutional reforms framed by Your Excellency in Council, in pursuance of a policy initiated more than two years ago. Your proposals in their present shape are the outcome of a tentative project placed, in August last year, in the hands of Local Governments in India with instructions to consult important bodies and individuals representative of various classes of the community before putting their own conclusions before the Government of India. Those instructions, as you are very evidently justified in assuring me, were carried out with great care and thoroughness. After examining, moreover, the enormous mass of material gathered together in a prolonged operation, I gladly recognise the admirable industry, patience, thought and candour with which that material has been sifted by your Government and worked out into practical proposals, liberal in their spirit and comprehensive in their scope. I have taken all the pains demanded

by their importance to secure special consideration of them in Council. It is a sincere satisfaction to me to find myself able to accept the substantial part of Your Excellency's scheme, with such modifications as would naturally occur to different minds in handling problems of remarkable difficulty in themselves and reasonably open to a wide variety of solution.

THE IMPERIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL.

The original proposal of an Imperial Advisory Council was based on the interesting and attractive idea of associating ruling Chiefs and territorial magnates of British India in guardianship of common and Imperial interests and as a means of promoting more intimate relations among component parts of the Indian Empire. The general opinion of those whose assent and co-operation would be indispensable has proved adverse, and Your Excellency in Council now considers that the project should for the present not be proceeded with.

You still favour an Imperial Council composed only of ruling Chiefs. Lord Lytton made an experiment in this direction, but it remained without successful result. Lord Curzon afterwards proposed to create a Council composed exclusively of Princes contributing Imperial Service Troops, and deliberating on that subject exclusively. The opinion is pronounced that this also is likely to be unfruitful and ineffectual in practice. Your Excellency's project is narrower than the first of these two and wider than the second. I confess that, while entirely appreciating and sympathising with your object, I judge the practical difficulties in the way of such a Council

assembling under satisfactory conditions to be considerable, the expense, precedence, and housing, for instance, even if there were no others, yet if not definitely discontinued with a view to assembly it could possess little or no reality. It would obviously be a mistake to push the project unless it commands the clear assent and approval of those whose presence in the Council would be essential to its success, and the opinions expressed in the replies with which you have furnished me lead me to doubt whether that condition can be secured. But in case Your Excellency still favours this proposal, which is in itself attractive, I do not wish to express dissent at this stage, and if, after consultation with the leading Chiefs, you are able to devise a scheme that is at once acceptable to them and workable in practice, I am not inclined to place any obstacle in the way of a full and fair trial and in any event the doubt I have expressed must not be taken as discouraging consultation with individual Chiefs according to the existing practice, for nobody with any part to play in Indian Government can doubt the manifold advantages of still further developing not only amicable but confidential relations of this kind with the loyal rulers in Indian States, possessed as they are of such peculiar authority and experience.

PROVINCIAL ADVISORY COUNCILS.

Next I agree with Your Excellency in the judgment that the question of a Council of notables for British India only should not be entertained. I am inclined furthermore, for my own part, to doubt whether the

creation of Provincial Advisory Councils is likely to prove an experiment of any marked actual value. The origin of the demand for bodies of that character, whatever the strength of such a demand amounts to, is undoubtedly the desire for greater facilities in the discussion of public measures. Your Excellency indicates what strikes me as pointing in a more hopeful direction in the proposition that this claim for increased facilities of discussion should be met "rather by extending the powers of the existing Legislative Councils than by setting up large rival Councils which must to some extent conflict with them." Large or small, such rivalry would be almost certain to spring up, and from the first the new species of Council would be suspected as designed to be a check upon the old. As in the case of ruling Chiefs or of notables in British India, so here, informal consultation with the leading men of a locality would have most or all of the advantages of an Advisory Council without the many obvious disadvantages of duplicating political machinery.

ENLARGEMENT OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS.

From these proposals I pass to what is, and what you declared to be, the pith and substance of the despatch under reply. "The enlargement of the Legislative Councils," you say, "and the extension of their functions to the discussion of administrative questions are the widest, most deep-reaching and most substantial features of the scheme which we now put forward." This perfectly correct description evoked and justified the close scrutiny to which these features have been subjected

in my Council, and I am glad to believe that the result reveals few elements of material difference.

Your Government have now felt bound to deal first with the Imperial Legislative Council and from that work downwards to the Councils in the Provinces. I gather, however, from your despatch of the 21st March, 1907, that you would at that time have preferred, as Lord Lansdowne had done in 1892, to build up the higher fabric on the foundation of the Provincial Councils. In your circular letter of the 24th August, 1907, you observed that the most logical and convenient mode of dealing with the question would have been first to discuss and settle the composition, the electorates and the powers of the Provincial Legislative Councils, and then to build up on the basis of these materials a revised constitution for the Imperial Council. In the absence of proposals from the Local Governments and Administrations, you were precluded from adopting this course, and, therefore, you set tentatively before them the line on which first the Legislative Council of the Governor-General and thereafter those of Governors and Lieutenant-Governors might be constituted.

In your present letter you have followed the same order, but with the full materials before me such as are now supplied by local opinions, it appears to be both more convenient and, as you said, more logical to begin with the Provincial Councils and afterwards to consider the constitution of the Legislative Council of the Governor-General.

PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS.

The first question that arises touches the principle of representation. This is fully discussed in paragraphs 18 to 20, 26 to 31, and 34 of your letter. Citing previous discussions of the subject and referring to the precedent of the measures taken to give effect to the Statute of 1892, you adhere to the opinion that in the circumstances of India representation by classes and interests is the only practicable method of embodying the principle in the constitution of the Legislative Councils (paragraphs A. D.). You justly observe that the principle to be borne in mind is that the election by the wishes of the people is the ultimate object to be secured, whatever may be the actual machinery adopted for giving effect to it. (paragraph 29.) You consider that for certain limited interests Corporations of Presidency towns, Universities, Chambers of Commerce, planting communities and the like limited electorates must exist as at present, and you foresee no serious obstacle in carrying out arrangements for that purpose. Difficulties come into view when you go beyond these limited electorates and have to deal with large and widespread interests or communities, such as the landholding and professional classes, or with important minorities, such as Mahomedans in most provinces in India, and Sikhs in the Punjab. You dwell upon the great variety of conditions in the various provinces of the Indian Empire and the impossibility of applying any uniform system throughout, and your conclusion generally appears to be that class electorates should be framed where this is practicable and likely to

lead to good results, and in their failure or defect it will be necessary to have recourse to nomination.

With the general principles advanced by Your Excellency in this chapter of our discussion I am in entire accord. I agree that to some extent class representation must be maintained in the limited electorates to which you refer, and here, as you point out, no serious obstacle is to be anticipated. I agree also that the Legislative Council should reflect the leading elements of the population at large and that no system of representation would be satisfactory if it did not provide for the presence in the Councils of sufficient representatives of communities so important as are the Mahomedans and the landed classes. But, in examining your plans for obtaining their representation, I am struck with the difficulty of securing satisfactory electoral bodies under them and with the extent to which, as you expect, nomination will be demanded to supply the deficiencies of election. The same awkwardness and perplexity appear in obtaining satisfactory representation of the Indian commercial classes where, as is found generally throughout India with very few exceptions, they have not established Associations or Chambers to represent their interests.

The case of landholders is discussed in paragraphs 27 to 29 of your letter with immediate reference to the Imperial Legislative Council, and the situation is just the same. If separate representation is to be secured for local Councils you will "find it impossible to make any definite proposal which would admit of general

application." (Para 27). You see difficulties in devising a constituency that should consist only of landholders deriving a certain income from land (Para 28), and you point out with much force the objections to election by voluntary Associations. In these observations I agree, and especially in your remark that the recognition of Associations as electoral agencies should be regarded as a provisional arrangement to be maintained only until some regular electorate can be formed.

The same difficulties as you observe in paragraph 30 encounter the proposal to have a special electorate for Mahomedans in some Provinces, as in Bombay the Mahomedans are so scattered that common organisation for electoral purposes is thought impracticable. In other Provinces it is proposed to found a scheme partly on a property qualification and partly on a literary attainment; in others again it is suggested that recourse might be had to voluntary associations. One difficulty in regard to Mahomedans is not mentioned in your letter for the provision in Province of a special electorate giving them a definite proportion of the seats on the Councils might involve the refusal to them in that Province of a right to vote in the territorial electorates of which rural and Municipal Boards will afford the basis. If that were not done they would evidently have a double vote, and this would probably be resented by other classes of the population.

ELECTORAL COLLEGES.

Without rejecting the various expedients suggested by Your Excellency for adoption in order to secure the adequate presentation of these important classes on the

Councils, I suggest for your consideration that the object in view might be better secured, at any rate in the more advanced Provinces in India, by a modification of the system of a popular electorate founded on the principle of electoral Colleges. The use of this method is not in itself novel. It already exists in the group of District Boards and of Municipalities, which in several Provinces return members to the Provincial Councils. The election is not committed to the Boards or Municipalities directly. These bodies choose electors, who then proceed to elect the representative of the group. I will briefly describe the scheme that at present commends itself to me, and in order to make the method of working clear I will assume hypothetical figures for a given Province. Let it be supposed that the total population of the Province is 20 millions, of whom 15 millions are Hindus and 5 millions Mahomedans, and the number of members to be elected 12. Then since the Hindus are to Mahomedans as three to one, nine Hindus should be elected to three Mahomedans. In order to obtain these members, divide the Province into three electoral areas, in each of which three Hindus and one Mahomedan are to be returned. Then in each of these areas constitute an electoral College consisting of, let us say, a hundred members. In order to preserve the proportion between the two religions, 75 of these should be Hindus and 25 Mahomedans. This electoral College should be obtained by calling upon the various electorates, which might be (a) substantial landowners paying not less than a fixed amount of land-revenue, (b) the members of rural

or subdivisional Boards, (c) the members of District Boards, and (d) the members of Municipal Corporations, to return to it such candidates as they desired, a definite number being allotted to each electorate. Out of those offering themselves and obtaining votes, the 75 Hindus who obtained the majority of votes should be declared members of the College, and the 25 Musalmans who obtained the majority should similarly be declared elected. If the Musalmans returned did not provide 25 members for the electoral College, the deficiency would be made good by nomination. Having thus obtained an electoral College containing 75 Hindus and 25 Musalmans, that body would be called upon to elect three representatives for the Hindus and one for the Mahomedans. Each member of the College would have only one vote and could vote for only one candidate. In this way it is evident that it would be in the power of each section of the population to return a member in the proportion corresponding to its own proportion to the total population.

In the same way the desired proportion could be obtained of any representatives of any particular interest, as, for instance, of landowners. All that is necessary would be to constitute the electoral College in such a way that the number of electors representing the landowning interest should bear to the total number the same proportion as the members of Council representing that interest to be elected bear to the total number to be elected.

In this manner minorities would be protected against

exclusion by majorities and all large and important section of the population would have the opportunity of returning members in proportion to their ratio to the total population. Their choice could in that event be exercised in the best possible way, that, namely, of popular election, instead of requiring Government to supply deficiencies by the dubious method of nomination.

I do not wish definitely to prescribe such a scheme for adoption, whether locally or universally, but I commend it to your consideration. It appears to offer an expedient by which the objections against a system of nomination may be avoided, and it would work through a choice freely exercised by the electorate at large instead of by artificial electorates specially constituted for the purpose. No doubt it removes the primary voter by more than one stage from the ultimate choice and it does not profess to be simple. I can only say that it is quite as simple as any scheme for representation of minorities can ever be, the system of a single vote, which is an essential part of it. It is said to work satisfactorily in places where it is in existence, and it is easy of apprehension by the electors. It would have several great advantages. It would bring the classes specially concerned within the popular electorate, and so meet the criticisms of the Hindus to which you refer in paragraph 30; second, it establishes a principle that would be an answer to further claims for representation by special classes or Associations: third, it would ensure the persons chosen being actually drawn from the locality that the electoral College represents; fourth, it would provide a healthy stimulus to interest.

in local self-government by linking up local bodies (rural and Municipal Boards) more closely with the Provincial Legislative Councils. To this end it might be provided that the candidate for election to the Provincial Council must himself have taken part in local administration.

The due representation of the Indian mercantile community on which you touch in paragraph 31 of your letter might be included in the scheme if the commercial classes fail to organise themselves as you suggest that they may arrange to do, in Associations similar to the European Chambers of Commerce.

To meet possible objections founded on the difficulty of bringing together electoral Colleges to vote in one place, I may add that this is not contemplated in the scheme. You refer at the close of paragraph 28 to the success of the Calcutta University in organising the election of Fellows by a large number of graduates scattered all over India. The votes of the electors in each College could, I imagine, be collected in the same manner without requiring them to assemble at a common centre.

OFFICIAL MAJORITY TO BE DISPENSED WITH.

From the electoral structure I now turn to the official element in the constitution of Provincial Legislative Councils dealt with in paragraphs 43 to 56 of your letter. I first observe that in all of them you provide for a bare official majority, but you contemplate that in ordinary circumstances only the number of official members necessary for the transaction of business shall be able to attend. The first question, there-

fore, is the necessity of maintaining in these Councils the majority of officials.

We have before us to begin with the leading fact that in the important Province of Bombay there is in the Council, as at present composed, no official majority, and that the Bombay Government, even in the smaller of its alternative schemes, presented to Your Excellency in Council is willing to dispense with such a majority, considering the character of the Legislation ordinarily coming before a Provincial Council. It is not possible with due representation given to the various classes and interests in the community to do without a majority of officials. After a careful consideration, I have come to the conclusion that in Provincial Councils such a majority may be dispensed with provided that a substantial official majority is permanently maintained in the Imperial Legislative Council.

I do not conceal from myself the risks in such an arrangement. The non-official majority may press legislation of a character disapproved by the Executive Government. This should be met by the exercise of the power to withhold assent possessed by the head of the Government then. Although the local Legislature is vested with power to make laws for the peace and good government of the territories constituting the Province, still the range of subjects is considerably narrowed by the statutory exclusions now in force. Thus, for example, the local Legislature may not without the previous sanction of the Governor-General make or take into consideration any law affecting the public debt

of India or the Customs duties or any other tax or duty for the time being in force and imposed by the authority of the Governor-General in Council for the general purposes of the Government of India, or regulating currency or postal or telegraph business, or altering in any way the Indian Penal Code, or affecting religion or religious rites or usages, or affecting the discipline or maintenance of Naval or Military forces, or dealing with patents or copyright, or the relations of the Government with foreign Princes or States. It is difficult to see how any measure of such urgency that delay might work serious mischief can come before a Provincial Council; for mere opposition to a useful and beneficial project would not come within this description. On the other hand, and perhaps more often, there may be opposition on the part of the non-official Members to legislation that the Government desires. With a Council, however, representing divergent interests and realising together with its increased powers greater responsibility, a combination of all the non-official members to resist a measure proposed by the Government would be unlikely, and some non-officials at least would probably cast their votes on the side of the Government. If however, a combination of all the non-official members against the Government were to occur, that might be a very good reason for thinking that the proposed measure was really open to objection, and should not be proceeded with.

Your Excellency will recall since you came into the authority of Governor-General an Act proposed by a

Local Government which a representative Legislative Council would almost certainly have rejected. Your Excellency's action in withholding assent from the Act shows that in your judgment it would have been an advantage if the Local Government had been induced by a hostile vote to reconsider their Bill. If, in spite of such hostile vote, the comparatively rare case should arise where immediate legislation were still thought absolutely necessary, then the constitution as at present it stands provides an adequate remedy. The Governor-General in Council to-day possesses a concurrent power to legislate for any Province, and though I strongly favour a policy that would leave to each local Legislature the duty of providing for its own requirements, still I recognise in this power an ample safeguard, should, under exceptional circumstances, a real demand for its exercise arise.

CONSTITUTION OF PROVINCIAL COUNCILS.

This decision will make it necessary to modify to some extent the constitution of the several Provincial Councils proposed by you and will enable you to secure a wider representation. Subject to consideration of these details (which will not involve the postponement of the proposed Parliamentary Legislation for the amendment of the Indian Councils Act, 1892, and for other purposes), I am ready to accept generally the proposals for numbers and the constitution of the Councils set forth in your letter.

THE IMPERIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.

Your proposals in relation to the Imperial Legislative Council are necessarily entitled to the greatest weight. I

am glad to find myself able to accept them practically in their entirety. While I desire to liberalise as far as possible the Provincial Councils, I recognise that it is an essential condition of this policy that the Imperial supremacy shall be in no degree compromised. I must, therefore, regard it as essential that Your Excellency's Council in its Legislative as well as its Executive character should continue to be so constituted as to ensure its constant and uninterrupted power to fulfil the constitutional obligations that it owes and must always owe to His Majesty's Government and to the Imperial Parliament. I see formidable drawbacks that have certainly not escaped Your Excellency to the expedient which you propose, and I cannot regard with favour the power of calling into play an official majority while seeming to dispense with it. I am unable to persuade myself that to import a number of gentlemen to vote down something upon which they may or may not have heard the arguments will prove satisfactory. To secure the required relations, I am convinced that a permanent official majority in the Imperial Legislative Council is absolutely necessary, and this must outweigh the grave disadvantages that induce us to dispense with it in the Provincial Legislatures. It need not be in any sense an overwhelming majority, and this Your Excellency does not seek, but it must be substantial as it is certainly desirable that the Governor-General should be removed from the conflict of the division list and that the fate of any measure or Resolution should not rest on his vote alone.

I have already dealt in the earlier paragraphs of this Despatch with the elective principle, and it will be for Your Excellency to consider how far the popular electorate can be utilised for the return to your Legislative Council of landholders and Mahomedans. Some modifications of the scheme suggested for the Provinces will, no doubt, be necessary, and the electoral Colleges would probably have to be on the basis of Province and not of division, and the case of the Central Provinces would probably (in view of the disappearance of Advisory Councils) have to be met by nomination until a local Legislature is provided.

I accept your proposals for securing the representation of commerce both European and Indian.

I also agree to your proposals as to nomination, but it will be a matter for your consideration whether to meet the requirement of a substantial official majority. The number of nominated officials should not be raised.

Your plan for securing occasional representation for the interest of minorities such as the Sikhs, the Parsis, the Indian Christians, the Buddhists and the domiciled community meets with my entire approval, and I am in complete sympathy with your intention sometimes to appoint one or two experts in connection with legislation pending before Council.

INCREASED FACILITIES FOR DEBATE.

I turn to the proposals contained in paragraphs 57-59 of your despatch affording further facilities for debate. This subject, as Your Excellency remarks, was not dealt with in the earlier correspondence out of which your

present proposals arise, but I am entirely in accord with Your Excellency's Government in regarding it as of cardinal importance.

The existing law which confines discussion, except on the occasion of the Annual Financial Statement, to the Legislative proposals actually before the Council imposes a restriction that I am convinced is no longer either desirable or necessary. The plan of Your Excellency's Government contemplate a wide relaxation of this restriction, and in sanctioning it generally I am confident that these increased facilities, judiciously used, will be pronounced of the greatest advantage, not only by Councils and those whom they represent but also by Government who will gain additional opportunities both of becoming acquainted with the drift of public opinion and of explaining their own actions.

EFFECT OF THE RESOLUTIONS.

Taking the proposals in detail, I agree that the Resolutions to be moved should take the form of recommendations to Government, having only such force and effect as Government after consideration shall deem due to them. The introduction and discussion of Resolutions should not extend to subjects removed from the cognisance of Legislative Councils by statute, and must obviously be subject to rules and restrictions. These, as Your Excellency observes, may best be laid down in the first place when the rules of business are drawn up and developed thereafter as experience may show to be desirable. Meanwhile, I agree generally with the conditions suggested in paragraph 59 of your despatch. I must,

however, remark upon the first of the suggested conditions that isolated incidents of administration or personal questions may be and often are at the same time matters of public and general importance. It would, in my opinion, be sufficient to lay down that Resolutions must relate to matters of public and general importance, inasmuch as the President of the Council will have the power of deciding finally whether any proposed Resolution does, or does not, satisfy this condition.

INTERPELLATION.

In respect of rules on the asking of questions I have come to the conclusion that subject to such restrictions as may be found requisite in practice and to the existing general powers of the President the asking of supplementary questions should be allowed. Without these a system of formal questions met by formal replies must inevitably tend to become unreal and ineffective and in an assembly in which, under proper safeguards, free discussion and debate is permitted and encouraged, there can be no sufficient reason for prohibiting that method of eliciting information and expressing indirectly the opinions and wishes of the questioners.

DISCUSSION OF THE IMPERIAL BUDGET.

Special importance attaches to rules as to the discussion of the Imperial Budget and I recognise with much satisfaction the liberality of the proposals that you have placed before me. The changes under this head constitute a notable step in the direction of giving to the representatives of Indian opinion a part in the most important administrative operation of the political year.

I approve the dates suggested for the promulgation of the Financial Statement and for the beginning and ending of its discussion in Committee, and I anticipate valuable results from the knowledge which your Government will acquire in these debates of the views of those whom the proposed measures will chiefly and directly affect, and which it will be able to utilise in shaping its final financial proposals for the year. Generally, also, I approve the rules sketched in paragraph 64 for the regulation of discussions in Committee and of the moving of Resolutions and I concur in your opinion that the form of procedure should be such as to show clearly that the power of Executive action resides exclusively in Government, who, while inviting the free expression of opinion in the form of Resolutions, do not thereby forego any part of the power and responsibility which has been and must continue to be in their hands.

PROVINCIAL BUDGETS.

Your proposals for the discussion of the Provincial Budgets seem entirely sound. As in the case of the Imperial Budget, so with respect to the Provincial finances, I observe with satisfaction that provision is made for full and free discussion and for the consideration by Government of the results of such discussion before the final proposals for the year are framed, and I believe that under the system suggested by you the Local Governments will retain that ultimate control over the financial policy of their Provinces, without which not only the authority of the Government of India but als

that of the Secretary of State in Council and of Parliament would inevitably disappear.

FURTHER REFORMS.

Your Excellency claims for your scheme as a whole "that it will really and effectively" associate the people of India in the work not "only of occasional legislation but of actual every-day administration." The claim is abundantly justified, yet the scheme is not and hardly pretends to be a complete representation of the entire body of changes and improvements in the existing system that are evidently present to the minds of some of those whom your Government has consulted and that to the best of my judgment are now demanded by the situation described in the opening words of the despatch. It is evidently desirable, Your Excellency will agree, to present our reformed constitutional system as a whole. From this point of view it seems necessary to attempt without delay an effectual advance in the direction of local self-government.

LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT.

The principles that should inspire and regulate measures with this aim can hardly be laid down in sounder or clearer terms than in the Resolution published by the Government of India on the 18th May, 1882. I do not know where to look for a better expression of the views that should govern our policy under this important head, and I will venture to quote some passages in this memorable deliverance. Explaining the proposal for local self-government of that date the Government of India place themselves on ground which may well be our

ground also. "It is not primarily," they say, "with a view to improvement in administration that this measure is put forward and supported, it is chiefly desirable as an instrument of political and popular education;" and again "there appears to be great force in the argument that so long as the chief Executive officers are as a matter of course Chairmen of the Municipal and District Committees there is little chance of these Committees affording any effective training to their members in the management of local affairs or of the non-official members taking any real interest in local business. The non-official members must be led to feel that real power is placed in their hands and that they have real responsibilities to discharge." This anticipation has been, to some extent, warranted by experience. Funds have not existed for an efficient Executive staff. The official element within the local bodies has been in many places predominant. Non-official members have not been induced to such an extent as was hoped to take a real interest in local business because their powers and their responsibilities were not real. If Local Self-Government has so far been no marked success as a training ground, it is mainly for the reason that the constitution of the local bodies departed from what was affirmed in the Resolution to be "the true principle" that "the control should be exercised from without rather than from within; the Government should revise and check the acts of local bodies but not dictate them." I have no doubt that the Government of India to-day will affirm and actively shape their policy upon the principle authoritatively set forth by their predecessors in 1882:—

"It would be hopeless to expect any real development of self-government if the local bodies were subject to check and interference in matters of details, and the respective powers of Government and of the various local bodies should be clearly and distinctly defined by statute, so that there may be as little risk of friction and misunderstanding as possible within the limits to be laid down in each case; however, the Governor-General in Council is anxious that the fullest possible liberty of action should be given to local bodies."

THE STARTING POINT IN PUBLIC LIFE.

Your Excellency will recall that the Resolution from which I have quoted treats the sub-division, taluka or the tahsil as the smallest administrative unit. It is a question whether it would not be a wise policy to go further. The village in India (generally) has been the fundamental and indestructible unit of the social system, surviving the downfall of dynasty after dynasty. I desire Your Excellency in Council to consider the best way of carrying out a policy that would make the village a starting point of public life.

A SPECIAL DEPARTMENT.

The encouragement of local self-government being an object of this high importance in the better organisation of our Indian system, it remains to be considered how far in each Province it would be desirable to create a department for dealing exclusively with these local bodies, guiding and instructing them and correcting abuses in a form analogous to the operations of the Local-Government Board in this country. That, how-

ever, is a detail, though a weighty one in a question on which as a whole I confidently expect that Your Excellency will find much light in the forthcoming report of the Royal Commission on Decentralisation.

EXECUTIVE COUNCILS: ADMISSION OF INDIANS.

In the closing page of your letter Your Excellency raises a question of a high order of importance. You recognise as you inform me that the effect of our proposals will be to throw a greater burden on the heads of Local Governments, not only by reason of the actual increase of work caused by the long sittings of the Legislative Councils, but also because there will be considerable responsibility in dealing with the recommendations of those Councils. You then suggest the possibility that experience may show it to be desirable to strengthen the hands of the Lieutenant-Governors in the large Provinces by the creation of Executive Councils and of assisting the Governors of Madras and Bombay by enlarging the Executive Councils that now exist in these Presidencies.

I have to observe with respect to Bombay and Madras that the original scheme under the Act of 1833 provided for the appointment of three Members in these Presidencies. It seems conformable to the policy of this Despatch to take the power to raise to four the numbers of each of these Executive Councils of whom one, at least, should be an Indian. I would not, however, propose to make this a provision of a statute but would leave it to practice and usage growing into confirmed rule.

MORE EXECUTIVE COUNCILS IN THE LARGER PROVINCES.

As to the creation of Executive Councils in the larger Provinces, I am much impressed by both of the considerations that weigh with Your Excellency in throwing out the suggestion and more especially by the second of them. All will depend for the wise and efficient despatch of public business upon right relations between the supreme head of the Executive power in the Province and the Legislative Council. The question is whether these relations will be the more likely to adjust themselves effectively if the judgment of the Lieutenant-Governor is fortified and enlarged by two or more competent advisers with an official and responsible share in his deliberations.

Your Excellency anticipates longer sittings of the Legislative Council with increased activity of discussion, and the effectual representation of Provincial opinion and feeling as a guide to executive authority is the central object of the policy of Your Excellency's despatch. The aim of that policy is two-fold, at once to enable Government the better to realise the wants, interests and sentiment of the governed, and on the other hand to give the governed a better chance of understanding, as occasion arises, the case for the Government against the misrepresentations of ignorance and malice. That double object, as Your Excellency fully appreciates, is the foundation of the whole system in India and all over the world of administration and legislation either through or subject to the criticism of deliberative bodies, whether great or small.

The suggestion for the establishment of Executive Councils for Lieutenant-Governors, as Your Excellency

is aware, is not new. A really new problem or new solution is in truth surprisingly uncommon in the history of British Rule in India and of the political or administrative controversies connected with it. Indeed, without for an instant undervaluing the supreme necessity for caution and circumspection at every step and motion in Indian Government, it may be open to some question whether in some of these controversies before now even an erroneous conclusion would not have been better than no conclusion at all. The issue we are now considering was much discussed in obedience to the orders of the Secretary of State in 1868 by men of the highest authority on Indian questions and I do not conceive that after all the consideration given to the subject then and since, further consultations could be expected to bring any new arguments of weight and substance into view.

It has sometimes been argued that the creation of Executive Councils in the major Provinces would necessarily carry with it as in Bombay and Madras the appointment in each case of a Governor from Home. This would indeed be a "large departure from the present system of administration," almost amounting to the confusion and overthrow of that system reposing as it does upon the presence at the head of the highest administrative posts of officers trained and experienced in the complex requirements and diversified duties of the Indian Government. I take for granted, therefore, that the head of the Province will be, as now, a member of the Indian Civil Service appointed in such mode as the law prescribes.

THE POWER OF VETO.

I propose, therefore, to ask for power to create Executive Councils from time to time as may be found expedient. In this connection, we cannot ignore the necessity of securing that a constitutional change designed both to strengthen the authority and to lighten the labours of the head of the Province shall not impair the prompt exercise of Executive power. It will, therefore, be necessary to consider most carefully what degree of authority over the members of his Council in case of dissent should be vested in the head of a Province in which an Executive Council may be called into being. It was recognised by Parliament more than a century ago that the Governors of Madras and Bombay should be vested with a discretionary power of overruling these Councils in cases of high importance and essentially affecting the public interest and welfare. A power no less than this will obviously be required in the Provinces in which a Council may come to be associated with the head of the Executive, and I shall be glad if you will favour me with your views upon its definition. Your Excellency will readily understand that the use of such a power, while not to be evaded in the special cases for which it is designed, is not intended for a part of the ordinary mechanism of Government. Rather, in the language of the historical despatch of 1834, it is my belief that "in a punctual, constant and ever fastidious adherence to your ordinary rules of practice you will find the best security not only for the efficiency and also for the despatch of your Legislative proceedings."

The Reform Proposals.

Government of India's Despatch.

The following is the text of the Despatch of the Governor-General in Council to the Secretary of State for India on the Reform proposals :—

We have the honour to address you on the subject of the constitutional reforms which were initiated more than two years ago by H. E. the Viceroy in a minute reviewing the political situation in India. Lord Minto then pointed out how the growth of education encouraged by British Rule, had led to the rise of important classes claiming equality of citizenship, and aspiring to take a larger part in shaping the policy of the Government, and he appointed a Committee of his Council to consider the group of questions arising out of these novel conditions. From the discussions thus commenced there was developed, by stages which we need not detail, the tentative project of reform outlined in the Home Department letter to local Governments, No. 2310-17, dated the 24th August, 1907. After receiving your approval in Council, that letter was laid before Parliament and was published in England and India. The Local Governments to whom it was addressed were instructed to consult important bodies and individuals representative of various classes of the community before submitting their own conclusions to the Govern-

ment of India. These instructions have been carried on with great care and thoroughness.

RECEPTION OF THE SCHEME.

The provisional scheme thus submitted to the judgment of the Indian public comprised the creation of Imperial and Provincial Advisory Councils, the enlargement of the Legislative Councils, and more ample facilities for discussing the Imperial and Provincial Budgets. Every feature of our proposals has aroused keen interest, and has met with ample and outspoken criticism from the most intelligent members of Indian society, and the voluminous correspondence which we now enclose may be regarded as an adequate and exhaustive expression of the views of those who are qualified to pronounce an independent opinion on the weighty and intricate matters now under consideration. In a country where the separation of classes, castes, races and communities, is so marked as in India, and little common national sentiment has as yet been evolved, the natural tendency is, as the Bombay Government have pointed out, for the advocates of each particular class or interest to consider how their own advantage can best be furthered, and to overlook the wider aspects of the subject. This tendency comes out strongly in the non-official opinions forwarded by the local Governments. From the landholders, whether Hindu or Mahomedan, the scheme has met with a generally favourable reception. With very few exceptions, they either approve of the proposals regarding Advisory Councils or make suggestions which leave their principle untouched.

They welcome the separate representation of the landowning interest on the Legislative Councils, and many of them lay stress on the condition that the member elected to represent their class must himself belong to it. The Mahomedans point out that the reforms of 1892 paid no regard to the diversity of the interests involved, and that territorial representation, in so far as it was then introduced, has placed a monopoly of voting power in the hands of the professional class. Most of them express their satisfaction with the scheme of Advisory Councils, and they are unanimous in their commendation of the proposal to assign special seats to Mahomedans on the Legislative Councils, though some of them urge that the measure of representation offered to them falls short of that which their numbers and influence entitle them to demand. On the other hand the leaders of the professional class regard the Advisory Councils as superfluous and illusory: they protest against class electorates for the Legislative Councils; and they demand the formation of territorial constituencies on a scale which would render their own influence predominant. Comparatively few opinions have been received from the commercial and industrial classes. But all of them, whether European or Indian, agree in complaining that their interests have received insufficient consideration and that they ought to have more members on the Imperial Legislative Council.

DESPATCH OF THE 26TH OCTOBER, 1892.

The divergent opinions briefly summarised here bear striking testimony to the wisdom of Lord Lansdowne's Government in describing Indian society as "essentially

a congeries of widely separated classes, races and communities, with divergences of interests and hereditary sentiment which for ages have precluded common action or local unanimity," and in insisting that the representation of such a community could only be secured by assigning to each important class a member specially acquainted with its views. The conditions which existed then are shown by the present correspondence to continue still. Indeed, the advance in general education, that has taken place since 1892, has added to the complexity of the problem by bringing to the front classes which were then backward, and by making them more keenly conscious of their individual interests and more disposed to claim separate representation by means of special electorates. In framing the greatly enlarged scheme of reform, which is explained below, we have given careful consideration to the views of all classes, and we desire to acknowledge the value of the opinions which have been submitted by the educated members of all communities who, though their number is relatively small, deservedly occupy a special position by reason of their intellectual attainments and the attention they had given to public questions. With these preliminary observations we pass to the consideration, in fuller detail, of the actual proposals upon which we now submit our final recommendations to His Majesty's Government.

AN IMPERIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL.

OPINIONS ON ITS COMPOSITION.

The considerations by which we were influenced in proposing the creation of an Imperial Advisory Council

are fully stated in paragraph 4 of our letter of the 24th August, 1907. The Council then suggested was to consist of about sixty members, of whom twenty were to be Ruling Chiefs and the rest territorial magnates. The opinions of local Governments on the advantages of the scheme are divided. The views of the Madras Government are wholly adverse; the Government of Bombay cordially agree with the principle involved, but demur to the combination of Chiefs and territorial magnates, and suggest an Advisory Council of Ruling Chiefs for consultation on questions affecting them alone; the Lieutenant-Governors of Bengal and the United Provinces approve. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab is opposed to a mixed Council, but thinks that a smaller Council of Princes to discuss matters of imperial and general importance might be of advantage and suggests that to this Council there might be admitted a few men of wide reputation throughout India. The Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces takes substantially the same view. The Lieutenant-Governors of Burma and of Eastern Bengal and Assam approve generally of the scheme. Most of the non-officials receive with enthusiasm the general principle of associating the people more directly with the Government, but there is no unanimity in regard to the means by which this end may be attained, and the leading features of the Government proposal are generally condemned on various grounds. The main objections are that Ruling Chiefs will not sit with subjects of the British Government, who are necessarily of inferior status; that they have no knowledge of the condi-

tions of British India, and that they would for that reason be useless either for the purpose of advising the Government, or of diffusing information to the people. As regards territorial magnates, it is alleged that they are out of touch with the people, and that their interests are necessarily adverse to those of the great body of agriculturists.

CRITICISMS ON THE FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL.

Apart from the qualifications of its *personnel* the proposed Council is criticised on the ground that it would have no legal recognition and no formal powers; that the Government would be under no obligation to consult it or to be guided by its advice; that its proceedings would be secret, and that Government would have discretion to publish or not to publish them as it thought fit; and that the views of a nominated Council would command no respect if they were in conflict with those of the elected members of the Legislative Council, while if the two bodies concurred in opposing the Government the difficulties of the situation would be increased. The views of a number of Ruling Chiefs have been ascertained by letter and by personal consultation, and several political officers have also been consulted. The majority of Ruling Chiefs are opposed to the formation of a Council on which Ruling Chiefs and territorial magnates would sit together. Nearly all the political officers are of the same opinion.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

We have carefully considered and discussed these criticisms. In view of the opposition of the Chiefs to a

Council of mixed composition, and of the unfavourable reception which our proposal has met with in British India, we consider that the published scheme should not be proceeded with at present. It is possible that in course of time the relation of Native States to British India may become more intimate, and that common interest may arise which might with advantage be referred for discussion to a mixed Council or to a Council consisting of two Chambers, one of Chiefs and the other of Notables. But in present conditions we are of opinion that an attempt to create a mixed Council in any form would result in failure. We think, however, that there should be an Imperial Council composed only of Ruling Chiefs. The scope of such a Council would necessarily be narrower than that of a mixed Council, but there are many questions of an Imperial character on which the advice of Ruling Chiefs would be of great value, and we are of opinion that the time has come when they should be invited to assist the Governor-General in the guardianship of common and Imperial interests.

PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL OF BRITISH INDIAN NOTABLES.

The question then arises whether, in addition to a Council of Chiefs, there should be an Advisory Council composed exclusively of Notables of British India. As to this our view is that if an experiment is to be made in the direction of Advisory Councils, it should be made in the first instance, by the institution of Provincial Advisory Councils on the lines indicated below, and that the question of an Imperial Council of Notables for British India only should not be entertained until the

success of that experiment has been vindicated. It will always be open to the Viceroy to ask for the advice of members of Provincial Councils if he so desires.

THE COUNCIL OF CHIEFS.

Concerning the manner in which a Council of Chiefs should be called into existence we observe that legislation is not necessary and would not be appropriate ; we consider that the Council should be created in the exercise of the right of the Viceroy to choose his own advisers in respect of matters which are under his control as the head of the Government. This disposes of the various suggestions put forward in the papers, as to local recognition, statutory powers, election of the whole or part of the Council, periodical meetings, right of initiative, power to block Government measures by the vote of a majority of a certain strength, public discussion, and so forth. It puts the scheme on its proper footing and leaves it to develop by the natural process of growth to which all successful political institutions are due.

NUMBER AND TERM OF OFFICE.

Passing now to the questions of the number of the Council, the mode of appointment and the term of office, we recommend that it should be limited to such a number as is appropriate in view of the claims and traditions which have to be considered. We observe that the Imperial Privy Council proposed by Lord Lytton included only twelve Chiefs, and that His Lordship said that he could not recommend a larger number "without extending the honour to minors, or Chiefs of a rank too low for so

high and honourable an office or to Chiefs not wholly fitted for the dignity of Councillors." Eventually only eight Chiefs were given the title of Councillor of the Empress. As the Council should, in our opinion, be appointed by the Viceroy, it follows that neither hereditary tenure nor election would be admissible. The members would hold office during the Viceroy's pleasure, and it would be at his discretion to consult any of them, individually or collectively, as he might think fit from time to time.

SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION.

There is abundant evidence in the opinions that have come before us of the existence of a strong feeling that the Council ought to be given some power of initiative, and that their discussions should not be strictly limited to matters formally referred to them. This view appears to us natural and reasonable, and we recommend that any member should have power at any time to ask that a question be referred to the Council. It would of course be entirely in the discretion of the Viceroy to grant such a request. We do not, however, think it desirable in announcing the creation of the Council to enumerate by way of catalogue the subjects to be referred to it. Such an enumeration would, on the one hand, tend to limit consultation, while on the other it might lead to the Council being overburdened at starting with of a list of subjects, some of which did not call for immediate consideration. We have little doubt that questions will arise from time to time the disposal of which will be materially facilitated by the deliberations of such a

Council as we contemplate. We do not think it advisable to define the scope of consultation more precisely, and for the present, at any rate, we would leave the whole matter to the unfettered discretion of the Viceroy.

MEETINGS AND PROCEDURE.

For much the same reasons it does not appear to us to be necessary, until further experience has been gained of the actual working of the Council, to determine whether it should meet periodically, and, if so, at what intervals. That will obviously depend partly upon the amount of business to be brought before the Council and partly on the question whether the nature of the business is such as to call for personal and collective discussion, or whether it can more conveniently be dealt with by means of correspondence. It is true that the opinions on the subject both those of the Chiefs and those sent up by local Governments, are in general agreement that the Council should meet once a year at least. It has, however, been pointed out by several critics that the expense of assembling the Council would be considerable, and could not fairly be charged either on the taxpayers of British India or on those of the Native States. We observe, moreover, that some of the more important Chiefs dislike the idea of collective consultation, that they hint at difficulties of precedence among themselves, and that they evidently consider free discussion to be only possible among equals. These Chiefs express a preference for consultation by letter, or for the appointment of certain Chiefs to offer advice when they think it necessary. They do not wish to be invited to attend meetings, both for the

personal reasons already suggested, and because of the expense and inconvenience and the interruption of their regular administrative work. It appears to us that there is much force in these objections. We believe, however that they might be got over by holding a meeting in the first instance for the purpose of inaugurating the Council and of giving opportunity for an informal interchange of views, and then conducting the business of the Council by means of correspondence, unless some occasion should render it desirable to call together the entire body. In our opinion the proceedings of Council when invited to assemble for collective consultation should ordinarily be confidential; but it would rest with the Viceroy after consultation with the Council to cause a statement of the subjects discussed and the decisions, arrived at to be published.

PROVINCIAL ADVISORY COUNCILS.

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA'S ORIGINAL PROPOSAL.

In our letter of the 24th August, 1907, we suggested that the various Provincial Governments should, when the local conditions admit, be furnished with a selected body of advisers, whom they would consult upon all measures of importance affecting the populations committed to their charge. These Provincial Councils were to be of smaller size than the Imperial Council then contemplated, but their membership was to be large enough to embrace all interests of sufficient importance to claim representation on such a body. The greater and smaller landholders, industry, commerce, capital, and the professional classes were to be included in the

Council; and it was observed that the association of non-official Europeans, standing for these important interests, with the natural leaders of Indian society in common consultation on matters of public importance would tend to promote a better understanding and to clear away on both sides injurious prejudices and misconceptions. Each local Government was to be at liberty to consult its Advisory Council, either individually or collectively, in regard to any provincial question.

VIEWS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.

The replies of local Governments are not unanimous, but on the whole they are in favour of the proposal. The Government of Bombay approve of the general idea, but consider that the practical success of the Council must depend on the personal weight and influence of its members, each of whom should, as far as possible, represent some important class or interest. Their number should not exceed twenty; all should be nominated for three years; and the Council should elect its own President in the absence of the Governor. A separate Council of not more than five members should be appointed for Sind. The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal proposes a Council of about thirty members representing large and small landholders, Feudatory Chiefs, European and Indian Commerce, tea and indigo the professions, the University, the District Boards and the Municipalities. The Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces suggests that the Council should consist of thirty-five nominated members, including

representatives of the Province on the Imperial-Council, and four elected members of the Provincial Legislative Council, the balance being made up by representatives of land, industry, commerce, the planting community, the professional classes, and educational and religious interests. The Council should be free to choose its own President and Secretary, and should conduct its deliberations in the absence of any Government official. The Lieutenant-Governor of Burma approves of the scheme as a general measure of policy, but considers that the Province is not yet ripe for such a measure. The Lieutenant-Governor of Eastern Bengal and Assam thinks it doubtful whether a Provincial Advisory Council could be easily got together owing to the expense and labour of attending meetings. He suggests a Council composed of the members of the Legislative Council and representatives of other interests, including members elected by the District Advisory Councils which he thinks should be formed. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab dwells on the difficulty of finding suitable men for an Advisory Council and a Legislative Council and observes that if, for the sake of uniformity, it is necessary to have an Advisory Council in the Punjab, its number should be the smallest compatible with adequate representation of the main creeds, classes and interests. He considers that five or at the most seven Councillors would be sufficient. The Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces proposes a Council of twenty-five comprising eight members elected by District Boards and large Municipalities, six mem ber,

nominated to represent the commercial classes and minorities, and eleven official members. The Madras Government criticise the published scheme on the grounds stated at length in their letter of the 13th March, and, instead of creating a Provincial Advisory Council, propose to consult the non-official members of their Legislative Council informally when they require advice. In regard to the question whether the proceedings of the Council should be strictly private and confidential, or whether some provision should be made for public conferences, we find few definite expressions of the opinion of local Governments. The Governments of Eastern Bengal and the United Provinces appear to contemplate giving a certain amount of publicity to the proceedings of the comparatively large Councils which they propose, and the Government of Bombay, though they propose a relatively small Council, do not suggest that its proceedings should necessarily be confidential. On the other hand, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal advises that the proceedings should be "informal, private and confidential," while for the Punjab a small confidential Council is proposed.

VIEWS OF OTHER PERSONS.

The opinions before us from other persons are beyond doubt in favour of the creation of some form of Provincial Advisory Council in order to bring the people more closely into touch with local Governments. There is, however, considerable diversity of opinion as to the size and constitution of the proposed Council. Suggestions vary from a small Council of not less than ten represen-

ting land, commerce, the professions and retired officials, to larger bodies of fifty, sixty or eighty members partly elected and partly nominated. Generally speaking, the tendency of the professional middle class is to propose a rather large statutory Council, wholly or partly elected so as to represent a variety of interests, holding public sittings at regular intervals, and exercising extensive legal powers which would include an unlimited initiative, power to ask questions and to call for information and papers, and an absolute or suspensory vote on Government proposals. The landholders are mainly concerned with securing adequate or preponderant representation for themselves, but many of them make much the same proposals as the professional class. The Maharajah of Benares puts forward the suggestion, which has been adopted by the United Provinces Government, that the Council should have its own President and Secretary; Sir Faiyaz Ali Khan proposes an elected Council; the Rajah of Malabar pleads for legal recognition, periodical meetings, public discussion, and election of members. The British Indian Association advocate district representation, power of initiating questions, and publication of opinions. The Mahomedan opinions are almost unanimous in desiring a Council but differ as to its composition. Some ask for large Councils on which each district would have a representative; others propose smaller bodies with twenty-five or thirty members. Several writers suggest that religious interests should be specially represented. Among the Mahomedans of the Punjab the best opinion accepts a small Council of six or seven members as appropriate.

FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF INDIA.

The demand for Advisory Councils of large size, and for opportunities of public debate, appears to us to have its origin mainly in the feeling, which has been generally expressed, that there ought to be greater facilities for the discussion of public measures than now exist. We recognise the force of this claim, but we think that it should be met rather by extending the powers of the existing Legislative Councils than by setting up large rival Councils which must to some extent conflict with them. In the recommendations which we shall presently submit to Your Lordship in regard to the Legislative Councils we have suggested the removal of the restrictions which now prevent debate on matters which are not before the Council in the form of the legislation, and we believe that this change should satisfy those who ask for large Advisory Councils for the reason given above. But the question remains whether it would not be of advantage for the Head of a local Government to have a small body of Councillors to whom he could turn for advice before his policy was definitely shaped or whom he could use as a channel of communication with the public in matters which could not conveniently be brought before the Legislative Council. Beyond doubt the bulk of opinion is in favour of the formation of some consultative body, and we recommend that Advisory Councils of the character indicated above should be constituted in those Provinces in which the Head of the Government is of opinion that they

would be of service. Conditions vary, and we would not compel any local Government to make what, after all, can only be an experiment, unless local conditions were held to warrant it. But we believe that such Councils, if wisely directed, might become of marked value in some Provinces. They would provide a means of obtaining advice both on proposals for legislation and on administrative questions, and of conveying information as to the intentions and motives of Government, and further they would be a visible sign of the desire of the Government to take the best minds in the Province into their confidence. It is, however, in our opinion, essential that such Councils should be limited in size and that the decision as to their numbers should rest with the Government of India. The reason for this is plain; the effect of any departure from the standard model would not be confined to a single Province, but would inevitably affect the administration of other Provinces and of India as a whole. The appointment of members would naturally rest with the local Government and in our judgment the criterion of membership should be distinction of some kind, whether arising from intellectual capacity, personal influence, or representative position. It follows from the fact that the Councils are to be advisory bodies only, that no legislation is required for their creation. We do not propose to attempt any formal enumeration of the subjects with which such Councils should deal. We think it sufficient to say that the Council should consider matters referred to it by the head of the Government, but that any member should have power

at any time to ask that a question be referred to the Council. It would of course be entirely in the discretion of the head of the Government to decline to refer a particular question to the Council. We are of opinion that a record should in all cases be kept of the subjects discussed and of the conclusions arrived at, and that it should rest with the head of the Government to determine in consultation with the Council whether and in what form a statement of the views of the Council should be published.

THE IMPERIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.

The history of the various stages by which the Imperial Legislative Council has developed into its present form is given in Sir Courtenay Ilbert's "Government of India" and need not be repeated here. Under the law and rules at present in force the Council stands thus:—

EX-OFFICIO.

The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal (or of the Punjab when the Council assembles in Simla), the Commander-in-Chief and the members of the Executive Council 8

ADDITIONAL.

A.—Nominated members; not more than six to be officials; the non-officials to be nominated with reference to legislative business or to represent interests 11

B.—Elected members 5

(a) by the Legislative Councils of Madras, Bombay, Bengal and the United Provinces 4

(b) by the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce 1

	Total	24
or including H. E. the Viceroy		25

In our letter of the 24th August, 1907, we suggested that effect might be given to the principle of the representation of classes and interests by means of a Council constituted in the following manner:—

EX-OFFICIO.

The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal (or of the Punjab when the Council assembles in Simla), the Commander-in-Chief, and the members of the Executive Council 8

ADDITIONAL.

- A.—Nominated members; not more than twenty to be officials; of the non-officials, one to be a Ruling Chief: four to represent minorities or special interests, not less than two being Mahomedans; and two, when necessary, to be experts nominated for special purposes 27
- B.—Elected members 18
- (a) by the Chambers of Commerce of Calcutta and Bombay 2
- (b) by the non-official members of the Provincial Councils of Madras, Bombay, Bengal, Eastern Bengal and Assam, the United Provinces, the Punjab and Burma 7
- (c) by the nobles and the great landowners of Madras, Bombay, Bengal, Eastern Bengal and Assam, the United Provinces, the Punjab, and the Central Provinces 7
- (d) by Mahomedans 2

Total ... 53

or, including H. E. the Viceroy

... 54

PRINCIPLE OF REPRESENTATION.

We have carefully considered the proposals of local Governments on the subject and the large body of non-official opinions submitted. In our judgment these papers bear out to the fullest extent the conclusion that representation by classes and interests is the only practicable method of embodying the elective principle in the constitution of the Indian Legislative Councils. A great array of authorities may be cited in support of this opinion. Twenty years ago, in the course of the discussions leading up to the Report of Sir George Chesney's Committee, Mr. (now Lord) MacDonnel, then Home Secretary to Lord Dufferin's Government, said in a note which was forwarded to the India Office: "The process of modifying the existing constitution of the Councils should proceed on a clear recognition and firm grasp of the fact that India is a congeries of races, nationalities, and creeds, widely differing *inter se* in a variety of ways." On the same occasion Sir George Chesney expressed similar views, and Sir Charles Aitchison observed that "the division of the people into creeds, castes and sects with varying and conflicting interests," rendered representation in the European sense an obvious impossibility. A passage in Lord Dufferin's Minute annexed to the Government of India's Despatch of the 6th November, 1888, describes the population of India as "composed of a large number of distinct nationalities, professing various religions, practising diverse rites, speaking different languages, while many of them are still further separated from one another by discordant prejudices, by conflicting

social usages, and even antagonistic material interests". This opinion is not confined to Englishmen, but is shared by competent Indian observers at the present day. In a recent address to a modern political association on the duty of patriotic Indians, H. H. the Aga Khan has given emphatic expression to similar sentiments. "In India," he says, "no such union as is essential to the creation of a strong, independent, homogeneous state is possible without centuries of consolidation. Even if we assume that the forces tending to unification are quickened by the machinery of modern civilisation, generations must pass before India is a nation. In very truth we can detect signs of the advent of that unity which is the first essential to the creation of a modern State."

These views receive striking independent confirmation from the debates in Parliament on the Indian Councils Bill which became law in 1892. In the Upper House Lord Ripon referred to the extreme difficulty of "selecting men who represented the various classes of the community and the various sections of opinion, as well as the various localities of India." Lord Kimberley said :—"The notion of a Parliamentary representation of so vast a country—almost as large as Europe—containing so large a number of different races is one of the wildest imaginations that ever entered the minds of men." He went on to emphasise the necessity of ascertaining the feelings of "a most important body. . . the Mahomedans of India. If you were to be guided entirely by the Hindu popular opinion you would find yourself in great difficulty." Lord Northbrook considered that pro-

vision should be made "for the representation of different classes of people—people of different races and different religions." In a later stage of the discussion Lord Kimberley agreed with Lord Northbrook, and observed,—"It has been found in this country not very easy to protect the interests of minorities by any contrivance that can be devised; but there must be found some mode in India of seeing that minorities such as the important body of Mahomedans, who are frequently in a minority in parts of that country, are fully represented." In the House of Commons the weightiest utterance was that of Mr. Gladstone, who referred to the difficulty of introducing the elective principle "in an Asiatic country like India with its ancient civilisation, with institutions so peculiar, with such diversities of races, religions and pursuits." He also drew attention to "the danger of having persons who represent particular cliques or classes or interests, and who may claim the honour of representing the people of India," thus anticipating the observation, now made by the Bombay Government, that "the educated classes, although a very small minority, appear to claim to represent the interests of all sections of the people, and are inclined to oppose any measures which appear likely to lessen their influence." Mr. Samuel Smith spoke of "the endless shades of caste, race, and religion in India"; Sir William Plowden and Sir Richard Temple followed in the same strain; and the latter observed that "in fixing the ratio of members, the interests to be represented, and the classes which constitute the bulk of the people, ought to

be the determining factors rather than the population."

To the principle thus affirmed by both Houses of Parliament Lord Lansdowne's Government endeavoured to give as wide a scope as was then possible, in the regulations framed by them for the constitution of the Provincial Legislative Councils. In the letters addressed by them to local Governments on the 15th August, 1892, they enumerated the interests which seemed to be of sufficient importance to require representation, and indicated the manner in which the seats to be filled by recommendation should be allotted so as to secure the object in view. The question of the direct representation of those interests on the Imperial Legislative Council did not at that time arise, as it was believed that the non-official members of the Provincial Legislative Councils, as reconstituted under the regulations then about to be made, would form a sufficiently wide electorate for the supreme Council. This electorate, however, while it has worked advantageously in the case of one class, can hardly be said to have afforded proportionate representation to the other interests concerned. Of the non-official members elected to the Imperial Council since 1893, 45 per cent. have belonged to the professional middle class; the landholders have obtained 27 per cent. of the seats, and the Mahomedans only 12 per cent.; while the Indian mercantile community, a large and increasingly important body, have had no representative at all. The advance of English education, and the demand of influential

classes and interests for representation on a more ample scale, now render it necessary to examine the whole subject in the light of the experience of the last fifteen years, and to treat it on more liberal and comprehensive lines than we have hitherto been able to follow. With the enlargement of the Imperial Council it ceases to be possible to rely exclusively upon a single source of recruitment. New constituencies must be formed, and in framing them we have to consider what sections of the population can properly claim representation for British India as a whole. With due regard for the limitations of a purely numerical test, we would refer to the following statistics of communities, interests, and adult male persons who can read and write, as indicating in a general way the main factors which enter into the problem. The figures are taken from the Census of 1901 and relate to British India only :—

COMMUNITIES.

		Number.	P. C.
Hindus	158,601,000	68
Mahomedans	53,804,000	23
Buddhists...	...	9,411,000	4
Christians	1,904,000	·81
Sikhs	1,574,000	·67
Jains	479,000	·20

INTERESTS.

Agriculture	155,678,000	67·1
Commerce and Industry	38,302,000	16·5
Professions	3,871,000	1·6

ADULT MALES.

Literate in English	652,000	1
Literate in Vernacular	8,616,000	14

Starting from these data, and bearing in mind the principles laid down by Parliament in 1892 for the guidance of Lord Lansdowne's Government, we propose that the Imperial Legislative Council should be constituted as follows :—

A.— <i>Ex-officio</i> members	8
B.—Officials representing Provinces	8
C.—Nominated members ; not more than fifteen to be officials ; the non-officials to be representatives of minorities or special interests, or experts	18
* D.—Elected members	28
†(a) by the Provincial Legislative Councils and by the Advisory Council of the Central Provinces	12
(b) by the landholders of Madras, Bombay, Bengal, Eastern Bengal and Assam, the United Provinces, the Punjab and the Central Provinces	7
(c) by Mahomedans of Bengal, Eastern Bengal and Assam, the United Provinces, the Punjab, and (alternately) Madras and Bombay	5
(d) by Chambers of Commerce of Calcutta and Bombay	2

* Some of these may at first have to be nominated, pending the formation of suitable electorates, but the intention is that all should eventually be elected, so far as may be practicable.

† Legislative Councils of Madras 2, Bombay 2, Bengal 2, United Provinces 2, Punjab 1, Burma 1, Eastern Bengal and Assam 1, and Provincial Advisory Council of Central Provinces 1.

‡(c) by representatives of Indian com- merce	2
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Total	...	62
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or, including H. E. the Viceroy	63
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The Council, when assembled in full strength, would be composed (excluding the Viceroy) of thirty-one officials and the same number of non-officials, so that His Excellency would only be called upon to vote in the event of the Council being equally divided. Our reasons for the constitution which we propose are stated in detail in the following paragraphs.

ENLARGEMENT OF THE COUNCIL.

In our letter of the 24th August, 1907, we suggested that the size of the Council should be more than doubled. Among local Governments, Bengal, the United Provinces, and Burma approve of the proposal and make suggestions tending to raise the number still further. The Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces is alarmed at the demand for additional official members, and throws out the suggestion that their number might be reduced by giving each official vote a double value. Most of the opinions forwarded favour enlargement, and a number of persons either propose a number in excess of 54, or make suggestions for the representation of particular interests which necessarily involve an expansion of the Council beyond that limit. We are impressed with the unanimity of the feeling in favour of

‡ To be nominated by the Governor-General, in consultation with local Governments, until a method of election can be devised.

a large Council, and we consider that the rise in the standard of general intelligence, and the universal desire for a greater share in the management of public business, render an increase inevitable and desirable. In view of the various classes and interests which claim representation, we find it impossible to propose a smaller number than sixty-two or, including H. E. the Viceroy, sixty-three.

POWER TO CREATE AN OFFICIAL MAJORITY.

The principle of an official majority was accepted by His Majesty's Government in the correspondence which took place last year, and was embodied, with their authority, in our letter of the 24th August 1907. We can discover nothing in the present correspondence that would justify us in proposing its surrender. It is obvious that under existing constitutional conditions the Government cannot resign, it must be able to settle the budget and procure supplies for the service of the country; and it cannot divest itself of the power to give effect by legislation to the decisions of His Majesty's Government. Those non-officials who approach the subject from its practical side clearly realise the anomaly of the Executive Government being placed in a permanent minority. In the scheme submitted to us by the Hon'ble Mr. Gokhale, who may be taken to represent the better informed section of Indian publicists, he carefully guards himself against any such idea. On the Councils outlined by him the Government is "assured of a standing majority behind it" and the head of the Government is further vested with a general veto. He asks only for "a mino-

rity—but a respectable minority” of non-official members. In all Provinces the opinions which carry most weight, owing to the position of the writers of their experience as members of a Legislative Council, proceed on similar lines ; though the strength of the official majorities proposed by them differs slightly, and some suggest that official votes should have a double value, or that the official proposals should prevail and that no cognisance should be taken of the votes. We gladly recognise the moderation and good sense by which these views are inspired. At the same time, in order to avoid the inconvenience and waste of power involved in taking a number of officers away from their ordinary work merely for the purpose of voting on the Government side, we would reduce the official majority to the narrowest limits. Our scheme provides (excluding H. E. the Viceroy) for thirty-one official members,—eight *ex-officio*, eight representing provinces, and fifteen appointed from among those officials at the head-quarters of Government whose services can be made available without undue interruption of their ordinary duties. In the event of the Council being equally divided so that thirty-one officials were on one side and thirty-one non-officials on the other, the Viceroy's vote would turn the scale.

ORDINARY CONSTITUTION OF THE COUNCIL.

We have stated in the last paragraph our reasons for deeming it essential to retain the power of procuring, in the last resort, the support of a majority of officials in our Legislative Councils. Subject to this

essential condition, we are prepared, in the Councils as constituted for ordinary purposes, to make a far larger concession than has as yet been suggested and to dispense with an official majority. We have every hope that the confidence we are willing to place in the intelligence and public spirit of the non-official members will be justified, and that increased responsibility will bring with it the requisite forbearance. We believe that on all ordinary occasions the Government may reckon with practical certainty upon securing sufficient non-official support to enable them to carry on the work of legislation with a Council containing less than the full quota of official members, and we are willing to give this system a fair trial. Our specification of the Council has been framed accordingly. The provision that of the nominated members not more than fifteen shall be officials will enable us to dispense with an official majority for ordinary purposes, and we anticipate that it will hardly ever be necessary to appoint so large a number of officials as would secure an absolute official majority. In short, we propose to work normally with a minority but to reserve power in the last resort to transform it into a majority.

OMISSION OF THE RULING CHIEF.

The inclusion of a Ruling Chief in the Imperial Legislative Council proposed last year is objected to by a large number of persons on the ground that it is anomalous that an outsider should take part in making laws by which neither he nor his subjects will be affected, and that in most cases a Chief can know very

little about the subjects with which British Indian legislation is concerned. We have considered these arguments, and we recommend that a Ruling Chief should not form an obligatory element of the Council. When there happen to be special reasons for appointing one, it will always be open to His Excellency to appoint him to one of the seats reserved for nomination, where he might at the same time serve the purpose of representing a minority such as the Mahomedan or the Sikh community.

REPRESENTATION OF THE PROFESSIONAL MIDDLE CLASS.

Our proposal to assign seven seats to the non-official members of the Provincial Councils of Madras, Bombay, Bengal, Eastern Bengal and Assam, the United Provinces, the Punjab, and Burma is accepted by all local Governments except the Punjab, which observes that as the number of non-official members on its Provincial Council will probably remain small, "it would be difficult, though not of course impossible, to concede to them the right of electing a member for the Imperial Council." This portion of the published scheme has, however, been attacked on the ground that it gives to the professional middle class only three more seats (corresponding to the three additional Provinces to be represented) than they now possess. Several suggestions are made for increasing the number by assigning two or more members to each of the Provincial Councils. We have considered these proposals, but we find it impossible to give each of the seven Provincial Councils

as many as two members without raising the total strength of the Imperial Council to an extent that would be inconvenient. We recommend, therefore, that the four Provinces which will have comparatively large Provincial Councils, namely, Madras, Bombay, Bengal and the United Provinces, should be allowed to elect two members, the three Provinces with smaller Councils, namely, the Punjab, Eastern Bengal and Assam, and Burma getting only one member each. This would raise the number of members elected by Provincial Legislative Councils from seven to eleven, which seems a fair allotment so far as the Provinces with Councils are concerned. The case of the Central Provinces has also to be considered. There is at present no Legislative Council in those Provinces, and there are difficulties in forming any kind of suitable electorate. For the present, therefore we think that some use may legitimately be made of the Advisory Council, and we consider that the representative might be nominated by the Chief Commissioner in consultation with that Council. This is perhaps not a very great advance, but it represents a somewhat nearer approach to election than nomination pure and simple, which appears to be the only practicable alternative.

REPRESENTATION OF LANDHOLDERS.

The proposal made in our letter of the 24th August, 1907, that the nobles and great land-owners of Madras, Bombay, Bengal, Eastern Bengal and Assam, the United provinces, the Punjab, and the Central Provinces should be represented by seven members, is generally approved

by the Local Governments, and has been well received by the landholders themselves, and we consider that it gives sufficient representation to the landed interest. The question, however, of the manner in which the members are to be selected is a difficult one, and there is little uniformity in the answers. The Governments of Madras and Bengal propose to form electorates based upon income from land. The United Provinces has a scheme for election proper in Agra, and another for election by associations in Oudh. The Government of Bombay made no suggestion as to the manner in which the representative of the Bombay landowners on the Imperial Council should be selected. The Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces thinks that the formation of an electorate is impossible, and puts forward a scheme for election by Durbaris combined with nomination. The Lieutenant-Governor of Eastern Bengal and Assam proposes election by an association, and the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab is in favour of nomination. Among these conflicting opinions it is impossible for us, with the materials available, to make any definite proposal which would admit of general application, nor is it probable that any uniform system would be feasible throughout India.

We may, however, discuss, as briefly as possible, the various suggestions that have been made. Of the proposals put forward in our published letter election by the landholding members of the Provincial Councils is rightly objected to on the ground that the electors, numbering from two to four only, would be likely to

differ over the selection of the candidates. Election by a constituency comprising all landholders who pay a certain amount of land revenue, or derive a certain income from land, is approved in principle by most people, though there is some difference of opinion as to the exact sums which should confer the franchise. But doubts are expressed by some Governments and several landholders as to the possibility of working such an electorate over an area so large as an entire Province, and the question is one that can only be settled by actual experiment. If the landholders themselves take a real interest in the matter, and are anxious to demonstrate their fitness to exercise the privilege of voting, Provinces will compete with each other in devising methods of election and the best system will in the long run prevail. Meanwhile we may point out that the success of the Calcutta University in organising the election of Fellows by a large number of graduates scattered all over India furnishes some ground for believing that the difficulties anticipated will not be found insuperable.

When regular electorates cannot be formed, the simplest and most convenient method of selecting members would be to recognise election by Associations. This practice has precedent in its favour. It was mentioned with approval in the Parliamentary debates on the Act of 1892, and in one form or another it appears in all of the existing regulations. There are, however, certain possibilities connected with it which may become more serious if the expansion of the Councils and the enlargement of their powers should stimulate the elec-

tionering spirit in India. If election by Associations is admitted as the standard means of giving representation to classes, it seems probable that rival Associations may claim recognition, and that it may be difficult to decide between them. There is also the danger that an Association may be captured by a small ring of politicians; that its original character may be transformed by changing the conditions of membership or by manipulating admissions; or again that the whole organisation may exist as the Hon'ble Malik Umar Haiyat Khan has suggested, "more on paper than in practice." Lastly, where parties are formed within an Association, with the result that the validity of an election is disputed and each party charges the other with fraud, it is obvious that the Government would find some difficulty in determining which of two rival candidates should be held to have been elected. For these reasons we consider that the recognition of Associations as electoral agencies should be regarded as a provisional arrangement to be maintained only until the interests which they purport to represent demand the formation of a regular electorate, and succeed in satisfying the Government that this step in advance is practicable. Where there are no representative Associations, and electorates cannot be formed the only possible alternative is to have recourse to nomination until the community have developed sufficiently to be fit for a more independent system. In applying each of these methods regard would be had to local conditions. For instance in the United Provinces the claim of the British Indian Association, which re-

presents the Oudh Taluqdars, to elect a member deserve special consideration ; but the principle to be borne in mind is that election by the wishes of the people is the ultimate object to be secured, whatever may be the actual machinery adopted for giving effect to it. We are in agreement with most of the landholders who have discussed the subject in considering it essential that in all cases the candidates for election should themselves be members of the electorate.

In framing these proposals we have not lost sight of the fact that the interests of landlords and tenants are by no means identical ; that our electorates will consist mainly, if not exclusively of the former class, and that no means can at present be devised of giving the great body of tenants direct representation on the Legislative Councils. Their interests, however, are in no danger of being overlooked. In the debate in the House of Lords on the 6th March 1890, both Lord Ripon and Lord Kimberley pointed out that when the Bengal Tenancy Act was under discussion in Lord Dufferin's Council "the only representative of the ryots was the Government." Among the official members of the Legislative Councils there will always be some experts in Indian land questions, who will be qualified to represent the views of the cultivators:

REPRESENTATIONS OF MAHOMEDANS.

All local Governments approve of the proposals for the special representation of Mahomedans which were made in our letter of the 24th August 1907. These proposals, are, as a rule, adversely criticised by the

Hindus, who regard them as an attempt to set one religion against the other, and thus to create a counterpoise to the influence of the educated middle class. Some Hindus, however, recognise the expediency of giving special representation to the Mahomedan community, and the Bombay Presidency Association, while they object strongly to the creation of a special Mahomedan electorate, make provision in their scheme of a Council for the election of two members by the Mahomedan community. Notwithstanding their formal protest against the principle of religious representation, the association doubtless realise that the Indian Mahomedans are much more than a religious body. They form, in fact, an absolutely separate community, distinct by marriage, food, and custom, and claiming in many cases to belong to a different race from the Hindus.

The first question is how many seats should be allotted to the Mahomedan community. After carefully considering the demands of the Mahomedans themselves and the views expressed by the Hindus, we think that the claims of the former will be adequately met if four elective seats are assigned to them, and provision is made for a fifth seat being filled by nomination until suitable machinery for election can be devised. The four elective seats should be permanently assigned to the four Provinces which have the largest Mahomedan population, namely, Bengal, Eastern Bengal and Assam, the Punjab and the United Provinces. The fifth seat should be given alternately to Bombay and Madras, where the

Mahomedan population is smaller, and for this it will be necessary to have recourse to nomination until satisfactory electorates can be formed.

The question of a Mahomedan electorate presents much the same difficulties as the formation of a land-holding electorate. In most Provinces the Mahomedans are in favour of election and regard nomination as an inferior method of obtaining admission to the Legislative Council. The Governments of Madras and the United Provinces propose electorates, based partly upon property and partly upon literary qualifications, which appear to us to be well devised, but the former Government have since expressed a preference for nomination. The Mahomedans of Bombay are said to be widely scattered over the Presidency, and at present unorganised for common purposes, so that a special electorate cannot be created. In course of time it may be possible to arrange for election by a central association, but for the present their proportionate representation can be secured only by careful nomination. The Government of Bengal proposes a scheme of a similar character which includes graduates of five years' standing and holders of recognized titles; both of these are doubtful features. The Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam suggests that the Mahomedan representative should be elected by the Provincial Mahomedan Association. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab considers it impossible to form a Mahomedan electorate, and proposes that the Mahomedan representative should be nominated by the Lieutenant-Governor. We would deal with the question in

the same way as we have proposed to deal with the representation of landholders. Our view is that in Provinces where election by a regular Mahomedan electorate is feasible, that method should be adopted; that Mahomedan Associations should be made use of where electorates cannot be formed; and that nomination by Government should be resorted to where neither of the first two methods is practicable. It will be for the Local Government to determine, in consultation with the leaders of the Mahomedan community, which plan should be adopted.

REPRESENTATION OF COMMERCE.

In the scheme put forward by us in August, 1907, two seats on the Council were assigned to the Chambers of Commerce of Calcutta and Bombay. No provision was made for the representation of Indian commerce otherwise than by nomination. The opinions show that there is a general feeling in favour of increasing the number of commercial representatives. It is difficult, however, to find room for more than four such members, and it is doubtful whether merchants not residing in Calcutta, will be willing to leave their own business to attend meetings of the Legislative Council. Taking four seats as the maximum that can be permanently allotted, we propose:—

(1) That two seats should be given to the Chambers of Commerce, of Calcutta and Bombay as representing in the largest sense European commerce throughout the whole of India;

(2) that two seats should be reserved for Indian Commerce, the members to be nominated by the Gover-

nor-General, in consultation with Local Governments until a method of election by commercial Associations is developed.

It may be said that the first proposal excludes from representation the European commercial interests of Burma, Madras, Upper India, Sind and the Punjab. On the other hand, the figures noted* show how enormously the commercial interests of Bengal and Bombay preponderate over those of the other Provinces. It may be added that the Chambers of Commerce of Calcutta and Bombay will naturally receive references from the other Chambers on subjects affecting European commercial interests, and will arrange to have them brought to the notice of the Council by their own members; that representatives of the other Chambers can be brought in by nomination as experts or in the place of officials; and that all of these bodies will recommend members for the Provincial Councils who will bring forward their views in the debates on the Budget. None of the local Governments suggest any practicable arrangement for the representation of Indian commerce by means of election, but we are disposed to think that if two permanent seats are assigned to that interest, Associations will in

* VALUE OF SEA-BORNE TRADE IN 1907-08.

			Rs.
Bengal 1,64,84,29,000
Bombay 1,67,53,10,000
Sind 42,65,26,000
Madras 43,70,37,000
Burma 63,55,69,000
Eastern Bengal and Assam 7,22,49,000

course of time be formed which will be sufficiently stable and representative to admit of their being utilised as electoral agencies.

SEATS RESERVED FOR NOMINATION.

We have explained above our reasons for recommending that the full Council should comprise not more than fifteen nominated officials, exclusive of the additional officials required for the purpose of representing the Provinces. We find it impossible without increasing the size of the Council, to assign more than three seats to nominated non-officials. This number, however, appears to us sufficient to enable the Governor-General to give occasional representation to the interests of minorities such as the Sikhs, the Parsis, the Indian Christians, the Buddhists, and the domiciled community, and sometimes to appoint one or two experts in connection with legislation pending before the Council. It may reasonably be expected that some, at least, of these minorities will obtain seats by the ordinary process of election while the others need only be represented at intervals. It must also be remembered that although fifteen nominated officials are provided for under head C. so as to guarantee in the last resort an absolute official majority, it will scarcely ever be necessary to appoint more than about six, and it may sometimes be possible to nominate non-officials to some of the seats reserved for officials. When we give power we create responsibility, and a solid opposition of all non-official members will not be so lightly undertaken in the larger Council of the future as in the smaller Council of the

past, where such opposition made no possible difference to the result.

PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS.

In our letter of the 24th August, 1907, no specific scheme of a Provincial Council was put forward, but the general principle was laid down that the widest representation should be given to classes, races, and interests, subject to the condition that an official majority must be maintained. These principles have been borne in mind by local Governments in the proposals which they have made, except that the Bombay Government desire to have no majority even in a Council of the maximum strength.

GENERAL REMARKS.

In framing proposals for the constitution of the Provincial Legislative Councils we have proceeded on the lines followed in the case of the Imperial Legislative Council. We have endeavoured to reduce the official majority to the narrowest limits by making the number of officials and non-officials (excluding the head of the Government) equal, so that, in the event of the full Council being equally divided, the vote of the Governor or Lieutenant-Governor would turn the scale. We have also laid down that of the nominated members not more than a certain number shall be officials; the non-officials being representatives of minorities or special interests or experts. This will enable the head of the Government to dispense with an official majority in the Council as ordinarily constituted, while at the same time retaining in his hands the power to appoint the entire number

of officials requisite to secure a majority of one in the full Council. We trust, however, that the closer association of officials with non-officials in public business, which will result from our proposals, will render it unnecessary to have recourse to this expedient. It may reasonably be anticipated that in the newly constituted Councils only as many officials need be appointed as will be sufficient, in conjunction with three or four non-officials, to enable the Government to carry their legislative measures. We have made no attempt to frame regular constituencies for the election of landholders, Mahomedans, and representatives of Indian commerce. The materials before us are insufficient for the purpose, and the conditions in different Provinces vary too much for any uniform plan to be feasible. Some Governments may be able to form electorates based upon payment of land revenue or income-tax or upon the income derived from land; others may permit Associations to recommend members; and others again may have recourse to nomination. It must be understood, therefore, that in describing certain classes of members as "elected" we use that term subject to the reservation that in some cases election in the ordinary sense may be found impossible or inexpedient. In any case the question to what extent election proper can be introduced will have to be considered further when the regulations are being drawn up, after the Act of 1892 has been amended. With these general observations, which apply to all of the Provincial Legislative Councils proposed by us except the Council for Burma,

we proceed to state our proposals for Councils of the maximum strength for each Province.

MADRAS.

Under the Rules at present in force the Madras Legislative Council stands thus :—

EX-OFFICIO.

Members of the Executive Council	...	2
Advocate-General	1

ADDITIONAL.

A.—Nominated members, not more than nine to be officials to represent different classes, one ordinarily to be a zemindar paying not less than Rs. 20,000 <i>pesh kash</i> annually			...	13
B.—Elected members			...	7
(a) by Corporation of Madras			...	1
(b) by Municipalities and District Boards				4
(c) by the University			1
(d) by the Chamber of Commerce, or other commercial bodies			1

Total ... 23

or, including the Governor ... 24

The statistics from 1893 to 1906 show the professional middle class, holding 66·6 of the selected seats; the landholders 5·5; European commercial members 24·1; and the representatives of Indian commerce 1·9. No Mahomedan has succeeded in obtaining a seat by election; and throughout the period the members elected by the District Boards and Municipalities have belonged,

with one exception, to the professional middle class. The communities and interests for which provision ought to be made in any comprehensive scheme of representation are the following:—

COMMUNITIES.

			Number.	Per cent
Hindus	34,048,000	80
Mahomedans	2,457,000	6
Christians	1,024,000	2·7

INTERESTS.

Agriculture	26,356,000	69
Commerce and Industry	6,998,000	18
Professions	620,000	1·6

ADULT MALES.

Literate in English	117,000	1·2
Literate in Vernacular...	1,587,000	16·5

In their letter of the 13th March, 1908, after discussing certain alternative schemes, the Madras Government proposed a Council of only thirty-three members, which was too small for the needs of the Province, and was open to the further objections that it gave insufficient representation to the professional middle class; that it assigned no separate seats to the landholders, and only one seat to the Mahomedans; that it made no provision for Indian commerce; and that it reserved two seats for election by two General Assemblies similar to the representative assemblies of Mysore and Travancore, on a plan which the local Government have since abandoned. In their letter of the 22nd August the

Government of Madras have now put forward the following plan of a Council :—

EX-OFFICIO.

Members of the Executive Council	2
Advocate-General	1

ADDITIONAL.

A.—Nominated members, not more than eighteen to be officials : the non-officials to be representatives of special interests or minorities or experts 21

B.—Elected members 17

(a) by Corporation of Madras ... 1

(b) by Municipalities and District Boards. 8

(c) by the University 1

(d) by landholders 4

(e) by Mahomedans 2

(f) by the Chamber of Commerce ... 1

Total 41

or, including the Governor 42

We recognise that this Council is framed on more liberal lines than that originally contemplated, but it is still defective in that it makes no provision for the representation of Indian commerce and the planting community by election. It also provides for a somewhat larger official majority than is really necessary. The Madras Government explain that they find it difficult to procure an official vote of more than nineteen members including the Advocate-General. They have, however, not

realised that the full official majority will only be required on rare occasions, so that the inconvenience and dislocation of public business which they anticipate will not be experienced in practice. We are decidedly of opinion that the Councils of the four larger Provinces should be formed on uniform lines, and after careful consideration of the local requirements we think that the total should be fixed at 46. We therefore recommend that the Madras Government should be required to enlarge their Council to a total of 46, excluding the Governor, as shown below :—

EX-OFFICIO.

Members of the Executive Council	2
Advocate-General	1

ADDITIONAL.

A.—Nominated members ; not more than 20 to be officials ; the non-officials to be representatives of special interests or minorities or experts			
...	24
B.—Elected members			
(a) by Corporation of Madras	1
(b) by Municipalities and District Boards	8
(c) by the University	1
(d) by landholders	4
(e) by the planting community	1
(f) by Mahomedans	2
(g) by the Chamber of Commerce	1
(h) by the Indian commercial community	1

Total ... 46

or, including the Governor ... 47

This scheme gives twice as many elected members as were originally proposed by the Madras Government; it raises the representation of the professional middle class from six to ten; it gives five elective seats to the landholders and planters and two to the Mahomedans; and it provides a separate member for the Indian commercial community.

BOMBAY.

Under the Act of 1892 and the regulations now in force the Bombay Legislative Council is constituted as follows:—

EX-OFFICIO.

Members of the Executive Council	...	2
Advocate-General	1

ADDITIONAL.

A.—Nominated members, not more than 9 to be officials; the non-officials to represent different classes of the community	...	12
B.—Elected members	...	8
(a) by Corporation of Bombay	...	1
(b) by Municipalities *	...	1
(c) by District Boards *	...	2
(d) by Bombay University	...	2
(e) by Sardars of the Deccan and Zamindars of Sind	...	2
(f) by Bombay Chamber of Commerce, or other commercial bodies	...	1
	Total	23
or, including the Governor	...	24

* Voting by electoral representatives on a population scale.

Including the Governor, this provides for an official majority of 13 officials against 11 non-officials. But, as is shown in paragraph 14 of the Bombay Government's letter, the present Council consists of 10 officials (including the Governor) and 14 non-officials. For all ordinary purposes this is safe enough, as the Government can probably reckon with certainty on some non-official support. Two non-official votes would be sufficient to equalise the numbers on either side, and the Governor's casting vote would then be decisive. Writing in 1906, Lord Lamington mentioned as defects in the composition of the present Council (a) the over-representation of Bombay city ; (b) the over-representation of the professional class ; (c) the under-representation of land and agriculture ; (d) the preponderance of Brahmans, whose interests were not identical with those of the mass of the Marathas and other castes. The Local Government expressed a similar opinion in 1906 when reporting on the working of the regulations made under the act of 1892. The statistics from 1893 to 1906 shew that the professional middle class obtained 50·7 per cent. of the elective seats ; the landholders 22·6 ; the Muhammadans 11·3 ; and Indian commerce 2·8. The chief component elements of the population are as follows :—

COMMUNITIES.

		Number.	Per cent.
Hindus	...	14,197,000	77
Muhammadans	...	3,726,000	20
Christians	...	205,000	1
Jains...	...	227,000	1

INTERESTS.

Agriculture	...	11,026,000	59
Commerce and Industry	...	3,715,000	20
Professions	...	323,000	17

ADULT MALES.

Literate in English	...	91,000	1.8
Literate in Vernacular	...	747,000	14.9

39. The Government of Bombay put forward two alternative schemes, a smaller one and a larger one. The smaller, which has the support of a majority of the local Executive Council, is as follows :—

EX-OFFICIO.

Members of the Executive Council	2
Advocate-General	1

ADDITIONAL.

A.—Nominated members; not more than 9 to be officials; the non-officials to be representatives of special interests or minorities, or experts			
...	24
B.—Elected members			
(a) by Corporation of Bombay	1
(b) by Municipalities	4
(c) by District Boards	4
(d) by the University	1
(e) by landholders	3
(f) by Bombay Chamber of Commerce...	1
(g) by Karachi Chamber of Commerce...	1
(h) by Mill-owners' Associations of Bombay and Ahmedabad alternately	1
(i) by Indian commercial community	1
Total			44
or, including the Governor			45

The advantages of this scheme are :—

- (1) That it gives adequate representation to European commerce, restores to the Karachi Chamber the seat taken away from it in 1896 (not, as the Bombay Government incorrectly say, in 1892), and admits the claim of the Mill industry to distinct recognition.
- (2) That it gives Indian Commerce one member to be elected by an association of native merchants.
- (3) That it assigns eight seats to the professional middle class through the district boards and municipalities, in addition to the members for the University and Corporation, so that this class will get ten out of seventeen elective seats and may get more by nomination.
- (4) That it gives three seats to the landholders.

On the other hand it has two conspicuous defects :—

- (a) It provides (including the Governor) for only 13 official members, 4 Ex-Officio and 9 nominated and thus leaves the Government in a substantial minority.
 - (b) It assigns no separate seats to the Muhammadans.
40. For these reasons we recommend that the Bombay scheme be modified as follows :—

EX-OFFICIO.

Members of Executive Council	2
Advocate-General	1

ADDITIONAL.

A.—Nominated members ; not more than 20 to be officials: the non-officials to be representatives of special interests or minorities or experts 23			
B.—Elected members 20			
(a) by Corporation of Bombay	1
(b) by Municipalities	4
(c) by District Boards	4
(d) by the University	1
(e) by landholders	3
(f) by Muhammadans	3
(g) by Bombay Chamber of Commerce	1
(h) by Karachi Chamber of Commerce	1
(i) by Mill-owners' Associations of Bombay and Ahmedabad alter- nately	1
(j) by Indian commercial commu- nity	1
Total			46
or, including the Governor			47

It will be observed that the provision made by us for the appointment of nominated members under head A of our scheme leaves it open to the Bombay Government to dispense with an official majority if they consider that they can carry on the business of the Council without one. As regards Muhammadans, the opinions sent up by the Bombay Government seem to indicate that nothing but separate representation will

satisfy the community, and that they resent the idea of nomination. We accordingly recommend that the Muhammadans should be given three seats, as proposed above, one for Sind and two for the Presidency; and that the Bombay Government should be asked to consider whether an electorate can be formed, or if that is not possible, whether associations, can be utilised for the purpose of proposing members for nomination by the Governor. We would further observe that our proposals are more liberal than those made by the Bombay Government, since they raise the number of elected members from 17 to 20. We do not think it necessary to discuss the second Bombay scheme, which has the support of only one member of the local Government.

B E N G A L.

41. The Bengal Legislative Council now stands thus :—

A.—Nominated members ; not more than 10 to be officials; the non-officials to represent different classes of the community.		... 13
B.—Elected members		... 7
(a) by Corporation of Calcutta	... 1	
(b) by Municipalities (by rotation)...	1	
(c) by District Boards (by rotation).	2	
(d) by the University	... 1	
(e) by Landholders' Associations	... 1	
(f) by Chamber of Commerce or other commercial bodies	... 1	

Total ... 20

or, including the Lieutenant-Governor ... 21

The statistics from 1893 to 1906 show that 52·8 per cent, of the elected members have been drawn from the

professional middle class, 13·2 from the landholders ; 5·7 from the Muhammadans ; 20·8 from the European commercial community ; and 3·8 from the representatives of Indian commerce. The chief elements of the population are :—

COMMUNITIES.

	Number.	Per cent.
Hindus ...	39,266,000	77
Muhammadans ...	9,027,000	18
Christians ...	246,000	·5

INTERESTS.

Agriculture ...	34,264,000	67
Commerce and Industry ...	7,048,000	13·8
Professions ...	856,000	1·6

ADULT MALES.

Literate in English ...	176,000	1·4
Literate in Vernacular ...	1,906,000	14·9

42. The Lieutenant-Governor proposes a Council constituted as follows :—

A.—Nominated members ; not more than 18 to be officials ; the non-officials to be representatives of special interests or minorities, or experts ... 22

B.—Elected members ... 14

(a) by Corporation of Calcutta ... 1

(b) by Municipalities and District Boards ... 7

(c) by the University ... 1

(d) by landholders ... 2

(e) by the Chamber of Commerce ... 1

(f) by the Calcutta Trades Association ... 1

(g) by the Indian commercial community ... 1 —

Total ... 36

or, including the Lieutenant-Governor ... 37

The scheme is almost identical with that propounded by the British Indian Association in their letter of 10th December 1907. Its weak points appear to us to be :—

- (1) That the Council suggested is too small.
- (2) That it gives insufficient representation to the educated classes.
- (3) That it gives too few seats to the landholders.
- (4) That it refuses separate representation to the Muhammadans.
- (5) That it assigns too few seats to European commerce, and does not provide for the representation of the planting community.

43. Our Hon'ble Colleague Sir Edward Baker was in general agreement with these criticisms on the local Government's scheme. And considering the views of the Lieutenant-Governor, we propose the following constitution :—

A.—Nominated members; not more than 23		
to be officials; the non-officials to be representatives of special interests or minorities or experts	...	26
B.—Elected members ...		
(a) by Corporation of Calcutta	...	1
(b) by Municipalities	...	4
(c) by District Boards	...	4
(d) by the University	...	1
(e) by Landholders	...	4
(f) by the planting community	...	1
(g) by Muhammadans	...	2
(h) by the Chamber of Commerce	...	1
(i) by the Calcutta Trades, Association	...	1
(j) by the Indian commercial community	...	1
<hr/>		
Total	...	46
or, including the Lieutenant-Governor	...	47

We believe this Council to be large enough to meet the requirements of the province, the population of which exceeds that of the United Provinces by only three millions. The Council suggested by us gives ten seats to the professional middle class, five to the landholders, including one for the planting community, who at the present time have vital interests at stake and cannot properly be omitted, two to the Muhammadans, and three to trade and commerce.

UNITED PROVINCES.

44. The Legislative Council of the United Provinces is at present constituted as follows:—

A.—Nominated members; not more than 7 to be officials; non-officials to represent different classes of the community		9
B.—Elected members		6
(a) by groups of Municipalities	2	
(b) by groups of District Boards	2	
(c) by University of Allahabad	1	
(d) by Upper India Chamber of Commerce or other commercial bodies	1	
Total		15

or, including the Lieutenant-Governor ... 16

In commenting on the working of the existing regulations Sir James LaTouche observed two years ago:—

- (1) That municipalities had practically always elected pleaders.
- (2) That District Boards do not as a rule elect great landowners. In illustration of this he pointed out that Munshis Nehal Chand and Madho Lall "belong to the English educated class and, though they hold land, are only incidentally landowners."

- (3) That no Muhammadan had ever been elected by a representative group. (Since this statement was made one has been appointed.)
- (4) That the professional middle class had generally secured five out of the six elective seats.
- (5) That Indian commerce was unrepresented. Sir John Hewett confirms this in paragraphs 12 and 29 of his letter.
- (6) That more official seats were needed in order to find places for the heads of the Education, Medical, Sanitary, and Agricultural Departments, and for the junior of the two Chief Engineers.

The statistics from 1893 show the professional middle class holding 50 per cent. of the elective seats, landholders 20·6; Muhammadans none; Indian merchants none, and European commerce 20·6. The principal elements of the population are:—

COMMUNITIES.

	Numbers.	Per cent.
Hindus ...	40,757,000	85
Muhammadans ...	6,731,000	14

INTERESTS.

Agriculture ...	31,181,000	66
Commerce and Industry ...	7,500,000	16
Professions ...	622,000	1·3

ADULT MALES.

Literate in English ...	65,000	·5
Literate in Vernacular	1,033,000	7·9

45. The reconstruction of the Council has been thoroughly worked out and explained in paragraphs 19 to 30 of the local Government's letter of the 16th march 1908. The Council proposed is thus constituted:—

A.—Nominated members ; not more than 22 to be officials ; the non-officials to repre- sent special interests or minorities ...			28
B.—Elected members ...			16
(a) by large Municipalities in rota- tion	2
(b) by District Boards and smaller Municipalities	8
(c) by Allahabad University	1
(d) by Landholders	2
(e) by Muhammadans	2
(f) by Upper India Chamber of Commerce	1

Total 44

or, including the Lieutenant-Governor ... 45

46. After carefully considering all the questions raised by the local Government's letter and the opinions forwarded with it, we recommend a Council composed as follows:—

A.—Nominated members ; not more than 23 to be officials ; the non-officials to be repre- sentatives of special interests or minori- ties, or experts... ..			27
B.—Elected members... ..			19
(a) by large Municipalities in rota- tion	2
(b) by District Boards and smaller Municipalities	8
(c) by Allahabad University	1
(d) by Landholders	2
(e) by Muhammadans	4
(f) by Upper India Chamber of Commerce	1
(g) by the Indian commercial com- munity	1

Total ... 46

or, including the Lieutenant-Governor ... 47

Our scheme does not differ materially from that proposed by the Lieutenant-Governor. The number, both of officials and non-officials, has been raised by one in order to bring the size up to that of the standard model. Provision has been made for the representation of the Muhammadans by four elected members, instead of by two elected and two nominated members, and a separate seat has been provided for the Indian commercial community, which will be filled up by election whenever a suitable constituency can be found.

EASTERN BENGAL AND ASSAM.

47. The Legislative Council of Eastern Bengal and Assam was established in October 1905. It consists of—

A.—Nominated members ; not more than 7 to be officials ; the non-officials to represent different classes of the community	...	9
B.—Elected members	...	6
(a) by Municipalities and District Boards	...	3
(b) by Associations of landholders	...	1
(c) by Associations of merchants	...	1
(d) by Commissioners of Port of Chittagong	...	1
	Total	15

or, including the Lieutenant-Governor ... 16

The chief component elements of the population are:—

COMMUNITIES.

	Number.	Per cent.
Hindus...	11,350,000	37
Muhammadans	17,813,000	53
Buddhists	172,000	5

INTERESTS.

Agriculture	...	23,957,000	78
Commerce and Indus-			
try	...	3,377,000	11
Professions	...	527,000	1·7

ADULT MALES.

Literate in English	...	62,000	·9
Literate in Vernacular		965,000	12·5

48. The local Government now proposes a Council constituted as follows:—

A.—Nominated members; not more than 12 to be officials; the non-officials to be representatives of special interests or minorities ... 15

B.—Elected members ... 10

(a) by Municipalities ... 2

(b) by District and Local Boards ... 3

(c) by Bengal Landholders' Association ... 1

(d) by Provincial Muhammadan Association ... 1

(e) by tea interest ... 1

(f) by jute interest ... 1

(g) by Commissioners of Port of Chittagong ... 1

Total ... 25

or, including the Lieutenant-Governor ... 26

49. This scheme appears to us to be defective in the following respects:—

- (1) A Council of 25 is too small for a province with a population of 31 millions, a large proportion of which consists of Bengalis of an advanced type.
- (2) The representation given to the professional middle class (5 seats) is insufficient.
- (3) The Muhammadans and the landholders are inadequately represented.

For these reasons we propose the following Council :—

A.—Nominated members: not more than 18 to be				
officials: the non-officials to be representatives of special interests or minorities or				
experts	21
B.—Elected members...				
	15
*(a) by Municipalities and District and Local				
Boards	8
(b) by landholders...	2
(c) by Muhammadans	2
(d) by tea interest...	1
(e) by jute interest...	1
(f) by Commissioners of Port of Chittagong	...			1

Total ... 36

or, including the Lieutenant-Governor ... 37

We find it impossible to enlarge the Legislative Council of Eastern Bengal and Assam up to the standard proposed for the older provinces, because it is difficult to provide more than 18 official members without unduly disturbing administrative business. But the proposals made by us appear to meet the essential requirements of the province. They give sufficient representation to the professional middle class, the landholders, and the Muhammadans, and they assign separate members to the tea and jute industries, and to the Commissioners of the growing port of Chittagong. The Assamese inhabitants of the Brahmaputra Valley will for the first time obtain

*Voting together by divisions, viz., Dacca 2, Chittagong 2, Rajshahi 2, Brahmaputra Valley 1, Surma Valley 1.

separate representation, and the reservation of three seats for nomination will place it in the power of the Lieutenant-Governor to meet the claims of the tenantry of the province to have an opportunity of expressing their views on the questions of the day. Although the Muhammadans form a majority of the population of the province, they are at present comparatively unorganized, and they can only be adequately represented by means of a special electorate.

PUNJAB.

50. The Punjab Legislative Council was established by the proclamation of 9th April 1897. It consists of—

A.—Nominated members—

Officials	4
Non-officials	5
Total					9

or, including the Lieutenant-Governor ... 10

All the members are nominated. The non-officials are one Christian, two Muhammadans, one Sikh, and one Hindu. In framing a scheme of representation the following factors have to be considered :—

COMMUNITIES.

	Number.	Per cent.
Hindus ...	7,874,000	38
Muhammadans ...	10,825,000	53
Sikhs ...	1,517,000	7

INTERESTS.

Agriculture ...	10,998,000	54
Commerce and Industry ...	4,814,000	23
Professions ...	450,000	2.2

ADULT MALES.

Literate in English ...	54,000	.9
Literate in vernacular ...	564,000	9.9

51. In paragraphs 40 to 46 of his letter of 6th July 1908 the Lieutenant-Governor proposes a Council of the following composition :—

A.—Nominated members; not more than 10 to be officials; the non-officials to represent Muhammadans, Hindus, Sikhs and other interests					17
B.—Elected members					4
(a) by the Commercial community					1
(b) by the Punjab University					1
(c) by the larger cities					2
Total					21

or, including the Lieutenant-Governor ... 22

52. In the Council proposed by the local Government, we find several features of which we are unable to approve. We think that no good reason has been assigned for giving to a Ruling Chief a place by right on the Council. We have excluded the Ruling Chief from the Imperial Council, relegating him to ordinary nomination in case it might be desired at any time to appoint one. No other Provincial Government contemplates the appointment of a Ruling Chief, and we are reluctant to admit this as a permanent feature of the Punjab Council. There is room for nominating a chief if desired, under the heads Muhammadans, Hindus, Sikhs, and other interests. Nor do we see any reason for the mention of a Native Christian among the commercial classes as that electorate may be expected invariably to return a European. As regards the members for the larger cities the Lieutenant-Governor proposes that the eleven cities mentioned by him should each nominate one represen-

tative, and that the two members of the Council should be selected by him from among these eleven nominees. In our opinion this method would be regarded as no better than nomination pure and simple. Each city, having only one chance in five of electing its nominee, would take no interest in the election, and the professional middle class would receive the proposal with great dissatisfaction.

53. We have had the advantage of discussing this objection with the Lieutenant-Governor, and with His Honour's concurrence we propose a Council constituted as follows:—

A.—Nominated members; not more than 12 to			
be officials; the non-officials to represent Muhammadans (2), Hindus (1), Sikhs			
(1) and other interests	19
B.—Elected members			
(a) by the commercial community	5
(b) by the Punjab University	1
(c) by the larger cities	3
Total			24
or, including the Lieutenant-Governor			25

The scheme thus modified promises to give adequate representation to the Hindus of the commercial and professional classes, and to the Muhammadan, Hindu and Sikh landowners, while it reserves three nominations for other interests not specifically provided for. The city electorate will consist of three groups representing respectively the Cis-Sutlej territory, the Central Punjab with the Sikh districts, and the Western Punjab in which the population is largely Muhammadan. We believe

these proposals to be as advanced as the present circumstances of the Punjab demand, and we recommend their acceptance.

BURMA.

54. The Burma Legislative Council was formed by proclamation in 1897, at the same time as that of the Punjab. As at present constituted it consists of—

Nominated members—

Officials	5
Non-officials	4
Total					9

or, including the Lieutenant-Governor ... 10

Two of the non-officials are Burmese. In practice the European non-official members are usually nominated by the Lieutenant-Governor after consultation with the Burma Chamber of Commerce, the Rangoon Port Commissioners, and the Municipal Committee of Rangoon.

55.—The Lieutenant-Governor proposes a Council constituted as follows:—

A.—Nominated officials	8
B.—Nominated non-officials—	6

(a) appointed after consultation with the Rangoon Trades' Association, Rangoon Port Commissioners and Municipal Committees of Rangoon, Mandalay, Moulmein, Bassein and Akyab ... 1

(b) to represent Indian and Chinese trading and mercantile interests ... 1

(c) to represent Burmese population ... 4

C.—Elected by the Burma Chamber of Commerce ... 1

Total ... 15

or, including the Lieutenant-Governor ... 16

56. The conditions of Burma are altogether peculiar; election is foreign to the ideas of the Burmese population, and neither they nor the Indian and Chinese immigrant commercial communities can at present be represented by any other means than nomination. In fact the only body in Burma that is capable of exercising the privilege of election is the Burma Chamber of Commerce.

For these reasons we propose a Council constituted as follows :—

A.—Nominated officials	8
B.—Nominated non-officials	7
(a) to represent Burmese population	4
(b) to represent Indian and Chinese commercial communities	2
(c) to represent other interests	1
C.—Elected by Burma Chamber of Commerce	1
				—
		Total	...	16
or, including the Lieutenant-Governor	17

RESOLUTIONS, QUESTIONS, AND DISCUSSION
OF THE BUDGET.

POWER TO MOVE RESOLUTIONS.

By the Act of 1861, under which the present legislative bodies were constituted, discussion was confined, to legislative proposals actually before the Councils in the form of Bills. In 1892 this limitation was relaxed to the extent of allowing debate on the annual financial statement although no legislation was involved, and in this debate it is permissible for members to draw attention to any matter they please, whether it arises directly out of the Budget proposals or not. But a general debate of this character can never be satisfactory. Members do not know beforehand the subjects which are to be brought forward by their colleagues; the discussion is necessarily of a desultory character; and the absence of notice not uncommonly prevents the official members from giving full information in answer to questions that are raised. We are of opinion that the time has come when there should be further facilities for debate. We think that members should have opportunities for placing their views on public questions before the Government and we are impressed with the benefits which both the Government and the educated public would derive from the well-ordered discussion of administrative subjects in the Legislative Councils, either on a reference from the head of the Government, or at the instance of a private member. Such discussions would give the Government an opportunity of making their view of a question

known, and of explaining the reasons, which had led them to adopt a particular line of action. We therefore propose that power should be given by statute for members to move Resolutions on matters of general public importance, subject to the checks to which we shall presently refer. So far as the educated public are concerned, there can be little doubt that the right to move Resolutions on such questions, and to argue these in a regular debate will be welcomed as a very great concession; that it will be resorted to freely; and that it will tend to bring about more intimate relations between the official and non-official members. We think that the Resolutions should be in the form of recommendations to the Government, because this form expresses the constitutional position more precisely, and emphasises the fact that the decision must in any case rest with the Government and not with the Council. In the event of a Resolution not being accepted by the Government an opportunity would be taken of explaining their reasons.

This subject was not included among those which Your Lordship authorised us to put before local Governments, and our letter of the 24th August, 1907, contained no reference to it. But it is a reform to which we attach great importance. In support of it we would point out that a similar proposal was put forward in 1888 by Sir George Chesney's Committee in reference to Provincial Councils. They recommended that, in addition to legislation, it should be one of the functions of the local Councils to originate advice and suggestions

on any subject connected with internal administration, and that their views should be embodied in the form of a memorandum addressed to the head of the Government. They advised, however, that it should not be permissible to propose Resolutions relating to subjects removed from the cognisance of the Provincial Legislative Councils by Section 43 of the Councils Act of 1861, which forbids them, except with the previous sanction of the Governor-General, "to make regulations or to take into consideration any law or regulation" relating to the public debt, customs, and Imperial taxes; coin, bills, and notes; post office and telegraph; altering the Penal Code; religion; army and navy; patents or copyright; foreign relations. That proposal was not adopted at the time, and it may have been premature in the conditions which then existed, but at least it had the high authority of the members of that Committee.

The discussion of the administrative questions can however only be permitted subject to certain rules and restrictions which must be clearly laid down. We do not feel ourselves in a position at the present stage to make an exhaustive enumeration of these, and we anticipate that, as has been the case in the House of Commons, actual experience will lead to the framing of standing orders designed to meet the exigencies of debate. It seems to us, however, that the following conditions must be imposed from the first:—

(1) Resolutions must relate to matters of public and general importance, and not to isolated incidents of administration or personal questions.

(2) No Resolution should have by itself any force or effect. It must rest with the Government to take action or not take action as it thinks fit. This is the English principle, and it is obvious that the Council cannot claim for its Resolutions a higher degree of authority than attaches to a Resolution of the House of Commons.

(3) The order of business must be absolutely under the control of the President, and no discussion of his orders can be permitted.

(4) The President must have power to disallow any Resolution without giving any other reason than that in his opinion it cannot be discussed consistently with the public interests. This will enable him to reject Resolutions which are contrary to public policy, or which relate to matters which could not be discussed without anticipating, or seeming to anticipate, the decision of the Secretary of State.

(5) In order to avoid the too frequent exercise of this general power of disallowing Resolutions certain classes of subjects ought to be expressly excluded. In the case of the Provincial Councils the proposals of Sir George Chesney's Committee referred to above seem to be suitable. In the Imperial Council the admissible range of discussion is necessarily larger, and it is less easy to define its limits precisely. For the present we think it sufficient to say that some subjects must be specially excluded, and that the question, which those should be, can be best settled later on when the rules of business are drawn up.

(6) It will also be necessary to place some limitation upon the time allotted to the discussion of Resolutions.

POWER TO ASK QUESTIONS.

The right of asking questions in the Legislative Councils, subject to certain conditions and restrictions, was conceded by the Indian Councils Act of 1891. We recommend that it should be extended to the enlarged Councils which we propose for the Punjab and Burma. We do not suggest any alteration in the rules governing the subject.

THE DISCUSSION OF THE BUDGET.

Under this head it was proposed in our published letter of the 24th August, 1907, that the budget should be explained by heads or groups of heads by the members in charge of departments, and should be discussed in the same way by the other members, and that this discussion should be followed by a general debate conducted on the same lines as at present. No method was suggested of enabling the non-official members to exercise any influence on the actual settlement of the items. The opinions received do not throw much light on the question. How the Government can give the Councils an effective share in the financial administration of India, without surrendering any essential principle, or parting with the right of original initiative and ultimate control. The Governments of Madras, Bombay, Bengal, the United Provinces, and the Punjab put forward, in more or less detail proposals for holding informal Conferences with the non-official members of the Legislative Council, when the first edition of the provincial budget has been prepared, and thus eliciting criticisms and suggestions which might be considered when the second edition comes to

be settled. The Bombay Government claim a greater degree of financial independence, and they and other Governments argue that, so long as the provincial budget requires the previous sanction of the Government of India the discussion in the full Council can deal only with settled facts, since no alterations can be introduced by the local Government in consequence of anything that may be said in the public debate. All Governments approve of discussion by heads as proposed in the published letter. No Government suggests any plan for enabling the full Council to debate and vote upon specific assignments of funds. The non-official critics either demand the power of moving amendments to any items of the budget, or express general approval of the Government of India's proposals.

We are clearly of opinion that it is advisable that the Councils should be afforded increased facilities for expressing their views upon the budget, and that these facilities should be given at a sufficiently early stage to enable the Government to take advantage of any advice that may be tendered and to adopt and give effect to such suggestions as may be found practicable. The ultimate control must, however, rest with the Government, and no useful purpose would be served by affecting to ignore this essential fact. It is the Government, and not the Council, that decides any question arising on the budget, and the utmost concession that can be made is to give the Council ample opportunities of making recommendations to the Government in respect of particular items. But, without departing from this

principle, we think that the Council may properly be empowered to record its opinion by vote on the greater part of the budget proposals. The Indian public have long desired an opportunity of this kind, and we think that the time has come when it may properly be given in the manner and to the extent which we shall presently explain. In our letter to local Governments we did not put forward any plan by which members of Legislative Councils could vote on the budget, but we are anxious to meet the public demand, and we trust that our proposals in the matter, both in regard to the Imperial and to the Provincial Councils, may obtain Your Lordship's approval.

THE IMPERIAL BUDGET.

These being the general objects which we have in view, we believe that they may be attained in the case of the Imperial budget by laying down that the financial statement shall be presented during the last five days in February; and that the final discussion of the budget shall take place not more than four weeks later. There are very strong reasons for being particular about dates and we need not enter here into the arrangements which will be necessary in order to admit of the budget being opened three weeks in advance of the usual time. The figures will be less accurate than they are now, and a considerable part of the detailed explanations which are now appended to the financial statement will have to be dropped. The Finance Member's speech will necessarily be more general in its tone, and will not describe the figures of expenditure with the same precision.

This disadvantage will, in our opinion, be amply counter-balanced by the fact that the earlier presentation of the budget will enable the Government to obtain the views of the Council on their financial proposals at a stage when it will still be possible to act upon their advice. On the presentation of the financial statement, it will be convenient for the Council to resolve itself into Committee for the discussion of the budget by blocks. It should be a Committee of the whole Council, with a Member of the Government in the chair ; and the first meeting should take place not later than one week after the day on which the budget is presented. The Committee should sit from day to day until its work is complete ; and there should be a rule requiring it to finish its business on or before the 10th of March ; since it is essential that the final corrections should all be known in good time to get the budget, with its supplementary tables and notes, into the shape in which it is to be finally presented.

For the purpose of discussion in Committee the major heads or groups of heads would be taken up in order, the discussion being opened with an explanatory speech by the Member of the Executive Council who controls the departments concerned, or if so arranged, by another member on his behalf. Each member would then be at liberty to move a Resolution, in the form of a recommendation to the Government, relating to the figures in any head or group, two days' notice being given in each case. The Council would divide upon any Resolutions which were pressed : and the result would be

duly recorded. But the Government would not be bound to take action upon any Resolution, either in whole or in part. Power should be vested in the Chairman to close the discussion upon any head or group when he thinks that it cannot be continued with advantage, and there should be a time limit for individual speeches. Here, as in paragraph 62 above, we desire to lay stress on the condition that the Resolutions should be in the form of recommendations to the Government, as indicating that the power of passing the budget is vested, not in the Council, but in the Executive Government. This is not a mere verbal refinement, it denotes a constitutional fact ; and it has the further advantage of avoiding any objection that may be taken to the scheme on the basis of the English rule that all proposals for the increase of expenditure must be initiated by the Crown. If it is necessary for us to support our proposals by a reference to Parliamentary practice, the requisite analogy is to be found in the right of the House of Commons to submit an address to the Crown recommending certain expenditure.

When the Council sitting in Committee has completed its labours, it will be for the Government to decide what alterations, if any, should be made in the budget as a result of the discussion. These would be carried out in the estimates at once. At the adjourned meeting of the Council, the Finance Member would submit the budget in its final form, along with a formal Report of the proceedings in Committee. This opportu-

would be taken to explain briefly why Government had been unable to accept any Resolutions that were carried in Committee. After the Finance Member's speech, a general discussion would follow ; but at this stage no further Resolutions would be admissible. The Finance Member would make a general reply and the Viceroy would sum up the debate ; whereupon the budget would come into effect.

THE PROVINCIAL BUDGETS.

In preparing its provincial budget, a local Government has no anxieties about ways and means in the wider sense of that term. Its surplus or deficit is absorbed in the general balances of India. It is not affected by remissions of taxation, for the effects of which the Imperial exchequer provides full compensation. Its sole concern is to keep the demands of its departments within its estimated revenue, without drawing unduly upon the provincial balance. In our opinion it is in this task that the Provincial Council may suitably assist the local Government. Nor ought such assistance to be unwelcome. For a local Government at budget time is flooded with proposals for new expenditure, and purely departmental efficiency may sometimes push aside more genuine needs. It is not, of course, suggested that the intervention of the Provincial Council will ensure an infallible judgment between conflicting claims. But it will put the proposals on their defence ; it will enlist some outside knowledge of local interests ; and it will give the non-official members a substantial share in the preparation of the Budget.

What we propose for adoption is a procedure in four stages. The first stage is the rough draft of the Provincial estimates. In this the local Government would include all projects for new expenditure in excess of Rs. 5,000 which are put forward by the different departments, provided that they are covered by administrative sanction, and that there is no *prima facie* objection to them. All such projects would be listed in a schedule, which would consist of two parts. In part I the local Government would place those items for which it considers that provision must be made in order to carry on a scheme already in hand, or in pursuance of orders from the Government of India or the Secretary of State, or to meet an urgent administrative need. All other items, not earmarked as above, would be put in part II of the schedule. The draft Budget, with this schedule of new expenditure, would then be submitted to the Government of India. Now it is manifest that an estimate of expenditure prepared on these lines is certain to exceed what the Province can afford. It would rest therefore with the Government of India, after correcting the estimate of revenue and the opening balance (which it always has to do at present), to determine, in consultation with the local Government, the aggregate expenditure for which the Provincial Budget should provide ; but the detailed correction of the expenditure estimates which is now undertaken in the Finance Department would be dispensed with. The alterations in the revenue figures, and the figure of total expenditure, as fixed by the Government of India would then be communicated

to the local Government. The Government of India would also reserve the power—we consider this essential—to alter or add to part I of the schedule.

The second stage would bring the Provincial Council upon the scene. We are inclined to think that the work would be better done by the Select Committee than by the more unwieldy body of the whole Council. We accordingly recommend the appointment of a Standing Finance Committee of the Council, numbering not more than 12: in the smaller Councils 8, or even 6, might suffice. There would be an equal number of officials and non-officials. The latter might be elected by the non-official members of the Council, once a year, by ballot or as directed by rules. The officials would be nominated by the local Government, and would be selected mainly for their capacity to represent the bigger spending departments. The Financial Secretary (or, in Madras and Bombay, the Member of Council who has charge of the Financial Department) would be Chairman, with a casting vote. Most local Governments have proposed a procedure substantially on these lines; and the recent action of the Governments of Madras and Bengal in appointing Committees of their Councils to consider the Budget informally has been received with general approval.

On receipt of the Government of India's orders on its draft Budget, the local Government would at once convene this Committee, place all the papers before it, and instruct it to revise part II of the schedule in such a manner as to bring the total estimates of expenditure

down to the figure sanctioned by the Government of India. The proceedings of the Committee would be private and informal. Discussion would be free, and the decisions would go by the vote of the majority. Where items were disputed, the officer representing the department concerned would be heard in their support, their urgency would be compared with that of items supported by other departments, and the Committee would then vote upon them on their merits. On occasion, the Committee might decide to insert in the Budget a project which had not appeared in the original estimate; and to this there appears to be no objection, if the scheme were one for which administrative sanction existed, or which the local Government were prepared to support. On the conclusion of its work, the Committee would report the corrections in part II which it considered necessary, in order to bring the total Budget expenditure within the figure sanctioned by the Government of India. After considering the Committee's proposals the local Government would revise its expenditure estimates, make any alteration in the revenue estimates, which the progress of actuals might suggest, and report the figures which it decided to accept under both heads to the Government of India for incorporation in the Imperial Budget.

The third stage would begin with the presentation of the estimates as a whole to the Provincial Council. On receiving the second edition of the estimates, as explained in the last paragraph, the Government of India would make no further changes on the expenditure side, unless in the exercise of a power which they must always re-

serve, they found it necessary to direct a general reduction of expenditure in consequence of any exceptional strain on either the Imperial or the Provincial resources. But they would bring the revenue figures up-to-date, give effect to any taxation proposals affecting the Budget, and insert any special grants for the Province which the Secretary of State might have sanctioned out of the Imperial surplus. They would then, in accordance with the present practice, compile the figures and incorporate them in the Imperial financial statement. An abstract of the figures, as thus settled, would be communicated to the local Government on the day when the Imperial Budget is opened. The local Government would at once print up its Budget, and call a meeting of its Provincial Council, when the Budget would be formally presented by the official in charge, with a speech describing its general purport.

The best method of conducting the consideration of the Budget would be for the Council to sit as a Committee. This would allow of greater freedom of debate, and it would permit the head of the Province to leave the chair and to put one of the official members in charge. In Committee, each head or group of heads would be taken up separately. The figures would be explained by the official member who represents the Administrative Department concerned. Any member would then be at liberty to move a Resolution, in the form of a recommendation to the local Government, regarding any entry in the head or group under discussion, and the Resolution would be debated and put to the vote. The oppo-

tunity would be taken by the official members to move any addition to the estimate of expenditure in consequence of an Imperial grant, or any reduction in consequence of a specific direction from the Government of India to curtail expenditure. All Resolutions carried by a majority of votes would be reported to the local Government; but it would be entirely at their discretion to accept any such Resolution in whole or in part, or to reject it. In order to allow sufficient time to have the provincial figures incorporated in the Imperial Budget before the latter is prepared in its final form, it would be necessary to close the discussion in Council by a certain date. Rules would have to be framed for this purpose.

The fourth stage would commence as soon as the Council sitting in Committee had finished with the Budget. The local Government would then consider what alterations, if any, were to be made as the result of the discussion. Without the Government of India's sanction, it would not be competent to change the revenue figures or to increase the total figure of expenditure as formerly settled by that Government. But it might, if it so desired with reference to the Committee's recommendations, vary the distribution of the expenditure in detail. The figures as finally altered would be telegraphed to the Government of India, and the final edition of the Provincial Budget would then be compiled and printed. This would be presented by the member in charge at an adjourned meeting of the Council along with a Report of the Committee's proceedings. He would

describe any changes that had been made in the figures, and explain why any Resolutions of the Committee had not been accepted by the local Government. A debate would follow; but no Resolution or voting would be permitted.

SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION.

In regulating the new system of discussion, whether in the Imperial or Provincial Councils, one of the first points for consideration is the range of subjects on which Resolutions and voting will be permitted. Since we propose taking our stand on the practice of the House of Commons, to lay down that no recommendation will be binding upon the Government, the limits within which Resolutions may be proposed can be very materially enlarged without running any risk of causing embarrassment or misunderstanding. It is clearly imperative, however, on grounds of public policy, that certain items both of revenue and of expenditure should be excluded from debate; and we annex to this despatch a schedule showing what heads of the Imperial and Provincial Budgets we consider should be thus reserved. We desire to draw attention to the large number of items which we have left open to discussion, and the comparatively small number which we propose to exclude. The grounds for exclusion are various. Some items both of revenue and expenditure are fixed by law, and the proper method of proposing any alteration of them is the introduction of a Bill. Most of the political heads are governed by treaties or engagements with which the Councils have no concern; the debt heads de-

pend upon contracts which cannot be altered ; and military and ecclesiastical charges raise far-reaching questions of policy which it would be inexpedient to discuss, and impossible to put to the vote. Finally, it is obvious that the Imperial Council can only discuss with advantage the revenue and expenditure which is under the administration of the Government of India, while a Provincial Council must equally be restricted to items subject to the control of the local Government. In addition to these specific reservations, which we have endeavoured to make as few as possible, it will be necessary to impose some further restrictions upon Resolutions with the object of preserving the business character of the debate and of restricting it, as far as possible, to the financial aspects of the Budget. The discussion of the Budget by heads is intended to deal with the settlement of the figures, and generalities having no direct bearing on this point should be ruled out as irrelevant at that stage, and relegated to the general debate. We apprehend that there will be no difficulty in framing a rule which will give to the Chairman of the Council when sitting as a Committee a general power to enforce this necessary distinction.

EFFECTS OF BUDGET PROPOSALS.

Our proposals under this head indicate a treatment of the Budgets which will maintain full power for the Government over ways and means, while giving the Councils a reasonable share in the settlement of expenditure. They will have a marked tendency to promote decentralisation, but they will in no way relax the control

which is exercised by the Secretary of State in Council over the expenditure of the revenues of India. They will confer on local Governments a larger measure of financial independence and will enable them in the exercise of these increased powers to avail themselves of the assistance of the Legislative Council to an extent which has hitherto been impossible. And, both in the Imperial and the Provincial Councils, they will place the representatives of all classes of the population in a position to take a more effective part in shaping the policy of the Government, and to exert a real influence upon the actual work of administration.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS.

In framing the proposals, which we now submit to your decision, we have given ample consideration to the great variety of opinion elicited by our letter of the 24th August, 1907. We readily acknowledge the value of many of the criticisms that have reached us and we believe that no material point has escaped our observation. We have accepted in substance several important suggestions, and we have introduced into our scheme measures of a far more advanced character than have hitherto been proposed. We will now sum up the results of our deliberations. In accordance with the most authoritative opinion we have abandoned the idea of an Imperial Advisory Council as originally planned and have substituted for it a Council of Chiefs to be appointed by the Viceroy, and utilised by him in the guardianship of common and Imperial interests as the demands of the time may require. We have planned

Provincial Advisory Councils on lines which will enable local Governments to avail themselves of the advice and co-operation of the leading representatives of the best non-official opinion, and we trust that the proposal will commend itself to popular feeling, and will satisfy the demand for extended opportunities of consultation on matters of local interests. The enlargement of the Legislative Councils, and the extension of their functions to the discussion of administrative questions, are the widest, most deep-reaching and most substantial features of the scheme which we now put forward. Taking first the Imperial Legislative Council, we propose to raise the total strength of the Council, excluding H. E. the Viceroy, from twenty-four to sixty-two, and to increase the number of non-official members from ten to thirty-one, and of elected members from five to twenty-eight. On all ordinary occasions we are ready to dispense with an official majority, and to rely upon the public spirit of the non-official members to enable us to carry on the necessary work of legislation. We have dealt with the Provincial Legislative Councils in an equally liberal manner. The total strength of the Council, and the numbers of non-official and elected members have in every instance, except that of Burma, been more than doubled. In all these cases, while giving fuller play to the elective principle, we have also greatly enlarged its range, and have endeavoured to afford proportionate representation to all classes that have reached a sufficiently high level of education, the land-holders, the Mahomedans, the professional middle

class, and the commercial community both Indian and European. To all of them, again, we propose to concede the novel right of moving Resolutions, and dividing the Council on administrative questions of public and general interest, and of taking part in settling the actual figures of the Budget, both by informal discussion and by bringing forward specific recommendations which will be put to the vote. Regarding the scheme as a whole, we consider ourselves justified in claiming for it that it will really and effectively associate the people of India with the Government in the work not only of occasional legislation but of actual every day administration. It is an attempt to give India a constitution framed on sufficiently liberal lines to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the most advanced Indians, whilst at the same time enlisting the support of the more conservative elements of Indian society. We are not without hope that it will be accepted by all classes in the spirit in which it has been planned, and that it will unite in the common service of India all those, whether officials or private individuals, who have her highest interests at heart.

In conclusion we have one more observation to make. We recognise that the effect of our proposals will be to throw a greater burden on the heads of local Governments, not only by reason of the actual increase of work caused by the longer sittings of the Legislative Councils, but also because there will be considerable responsibility in dealing with the recommendations of those Councils. It may be that experience will show

the desirability of strengthening the hands of Lieutenant-Governors in the larger provinces by the creation of Executive Councils, as Sir Charles Aitchison suggested in connection with the proposals of 1888, and assisting the Governors of Madras and Bombay by enlarging the Councils which now exist in those Presidencies. But it would be premature to discuss these contingencies until experience has been gained of the working of the new legislative bodies. The creation of Councils with executive functions in Provinces in which they do not exist would be a large departure from the present system of administration, and is a change that could only be recommended after the fullest consideration, and after consultation with the heads of the Provinces concerned.

77. We have appended schedules* to this despatch to illustrate our proposals. The first of them gives in parallel columns the numbers and constitution of the existing Legislative Councils and of those now proposed. The second shows the heads of the Financial Statement in respect of which we propose that resolutions may be moved, and also those heads which we think should not form the subject of resolutions, though they would be open to discussion in the general debate with which the budget procedure would terminate. The third states the substance of the amendments of the Act of 1892 which are necessitated by our proposals.

We have the honour to be,

My LORD,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servants,

MINTO.

KITCHENER.

H. E. RICHARDS.

C. H. SCOTT

H. ADAMSON.

J. O. MILLER.

W. L. HARVEY.

J. S. MESTON.

*See Appendix.

Lord Morley's Speech in the House of Lords.

Viscount Morley, who, on rising to make his promised statement on Indian policy, was received with cheers, said:—I feel that some apology is due to the House for the delay of which I have been the innocent cause. It has been said that my delay in bringing forward this subject is due to my anxiety to burke discussion. That is not in the least true. The reasons which seemed to me to make it desirable that discussion upon this most important and far-reaching range of topics should be postponed are reasons of common sense. In the first place, discussion without any one having seen the papers to be discussed would be ineffective; second, it would be impossible to discuss these papers without knowing, at all events to some degree, the nature of their reception in the country immediately concerned: and, third, I cannot but apprehend that discussion in Parliament would be calculated to prejudice the reception in India of the proposals which the Government of India and the Government at Home have agreed to make. This afternoon Your Lordships will be presented with a modest volume of one hundred pages, but to-morrow morning there will be ready a series of papers so numerous that the most voracious appetite for Blue-books will have ample food for the Christmas holidays. (*Laughter.*)

AN IMPORTANT EPOCH.

This is the opening of a very important chapter in the history of the relations between Great Britain and India. I suppose, like other Secretaries for India, my first idea was to have what they used to have in the old days: a permanent Committee to inquire into Indian Government. On the whole, I think there is a great deal in the present day to be said against that idea. Therefore, what I have done at the instigation of the Government of India is to open a chapter of constitutional reform, of which I will speak in a moment; and, in the next place, I appointed a Royal Commission to enquire into the internal relations between the Government of India and its subordinate and co-ordinate departments. That commission will, I hope, report in February or March of next year, and that again will involve both the Government of India and the India Office in laborious and careful inquiries. Unfortunately the delay which has taken place has not made the skies any brighter. But do not let us make the sky cloudier than it really is; do not let us consider the clouds darker than they really are. Let us look at the formidable difficulties which confront us without any undue sense of apprehension, and I can give no better example of what I mean than what I may call the intrepid coolness of Lord Minto. (*Cheers.*)

What is the state of things as they appear to persons of authority and ample knowledge in India? Well, the anarchists are few, but, on the other hand, they are apparently prepared to go any length and run any risk. An Indian friend of mine informs me that there is no fear

of anything in the nature of a rising, but that if murders continue a general panic may arise and greatly increase the danger of the situation. We cannot hope that any machinery will completely stop the outrages at once, but there is a growing indication that the native population itself is alarmed, and that the Government of India will have strong support from native public opinion. In substance, the view of the Government of India is that the position of our Government in India is as sound and well founded as it has ever been. (*Cheers.*)

THE ANTI-ANARCHIST LEGISLATION.

Then why, it may be asked, have the Government of India found it necessary to pass measures introducing drastic machinery? I share full responsibility for those measures. Quite early after coming to the India Office I had pressure put upon me to repeal the regulations of 1818 under which natives are now being deported without trial, without charge, or without intention to try or charge. That, of course, is a tremendous power to place in the hands of an Executive Government, but I declined to take out of the hands of the Government of India any weapon they possessed in circumstances so obscure, so formidable, and so impenetrable as the circumstances surrounding British Government in India. There are two paths of folly. One is to regard Indian matters as if they had to do with Great Britain or Ireland, and to insist that all powers must necessarily suit India; and the other is that all we have to do is, as to my amazement I have seen suggested in print, to blow a certain number of men from guns.

I do not ignore the frightful risks involved in transferring what ought to be power under the law into the power of arbitrary personal discretion. I do not forget the tremendous price we pay for all operations of this sort in the reaction and excitement which they provoke. But there are situations in which a responsible Government is bound to run these risks and pay this possible price. It is like war—a hateful thing. The only question for us is whether there is such a situation in India to-day as to justify the passing of this Act of the other day, and to justify a resort to 1818. I cannot imagine that any one reading the list of crimes given the other day, and remembering all that they stand for, can have any doubt that summary procedure is justified and called for.

After all, it is not our fault that India is like it is. We must protect the peaceful inhabitants, both Indian and European, from bloodshed. Believe me, it is no matter of form when I say—and I believe everybody in this House would say the same thing—that I deplore this necessity; but we are bound to face the fact, and I, myself, recognise the necessity with infinite regret, and something much deeper than regret. But it is not the Government here or in India who are the authors of this necessity, and I would not at all mind, if it were not impertinent or unbecoming on my part, to stand up in another place and say there what I say here—that I will do my best to support the Government. (*Cheers.*) Now the first important question that arises is that of reform, and I would ask your lordships to give close attention to it for a moment, because I am sure that here,

and elsewhere it will be argued that the necessity and the facts that cause strong repressive measures should arrest our policy of reforms. That has already been stated, and many people agree. But the Government of India and myself have, from the beginning, never varied in our determination to persevere in our policy of reform-*(Cheers.)* Perseverance in our plan of reform is not a concession to violence. Reforms we have publicly adopted and worked out for more than two years. It is no concession now too to violence to proceed with those reforms. It is simply standing to our guns, and is no weakness.

A gentleman to whom I would refer with the greatest respect recently addressed me in the public Press exhorting me to remember that Oriental countries invariably interpret kindness into fear. When I am told that Orientals always mistake kindness for fear I can only say I do not believe a word of it, any more than I believe the strong saying of Carlyle that, after all, the fundamental question between two human beings is "Can I kill thee, or canst thou kill me?" *(Laughter.)* I do not believe that either Oriental or Western society ever existed on either of these terms or that brutality is a true test of the relations between men. There are two alternative courses open to us. We must either withdraw our reforms or persevere with them. The first would be a most flagrant sign of weakness. The second alternative is to hold steadily on in spite of bombs. That is the point. Are we to let ourselves be openly forced by bombs or murder clubs to drop our policy? Who are those

who would be best pleased if I were to allow your Lordships to-night to sanction that the Government should drop these reforms? It is notorious that the men best pleased would be the extremists, the irreconcilables (*cheers*), because they know that if we do anything to soften the estrangement or appease the European or native population it would be the best way of driving them from their sinister and mischievous designs.

THE NEED FOR REFORMS.

Therefore, I hope you will agree that we are not wrong in proceeding with these reforms. Sir Norman Baker, the new Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, declared that, if these powers were not enough, he would apply for more, but he also said that these measures did not represent even a major part of the policy of dealing with the situation, and he believed that, when the constitutional reforms were finally announced, the task of restoring order in India would be on the road to accomplishment. For a man in Sir Norman's position to make a statement like that is sufficient, and all that Lord Minto needs, is to ask His Majesty's Government to proceed with the reforms. Experienced men, officials and others to whom I have put the question have replied that to withdraw is impossible. We cannot stand still. Supposing we did, I would not be surprised if there are not gentlemen here who would say that we ought to take some strong measures for putting down the free Press. A long time ago Sir Thomas Munroe used the language which I will quote in order that all who hear me, and all who read, may feel what tremendous difficulties arise—difficulties which our

successors, as our predecessors, will encounter. Sir Thomas Munroe said :—

“What we are trying to do is an experience never yet tried in the world—that of maintaining a foreign dominion by means of a native army, and teaching that army, through a native Press that they ought to expel us and deliver their country.” And he went on to say that a tremendous revolution might take place in consequence of a free Press.

I recognise to the full the enormous force in a declaration of that kind ; but let us look at it as practical men who govern the country. Supposing you abolish freedom of the Press, that will not do your business. You will then have to shut up the schools and colleges, because it would be no use abolishing the papers if you did not close these. But that will not do it. You will have to stop the printing of unlicensed books, and you will have to have repressive book legislation, as you have repressive regulations for bombs. But supposing you had done all this. When you had made India blind and gagged her, would you be able to call India, as now, the brightest jewel in the Imperial Crown ? No, you could not. The last man to minimise such a policy is the present Governor-General of India, the despatches between whom and the Government will be in Your Lordship's hands to-morrow.

THE PLAN OF REFORMS.

But what of the plan of reforms ? I think you will find that we have been guided in our policy by an expansion of the principles that were recognised so far back as

1861, and by the noble marquess opposite in 1892. In 1892 the noble marquess (the Marquess of Lansdowne) said he hoped we—meaning the Government of the day—had succeeded in giving to our proposals of Legislative Council reform sufficient to secure a satisfactory advance in the representation of the people on the Council and to give effect to the principle of selection, as far as possible, to such sections of the community as might be capable of assisting us in that manner. The noble marquess (the Marquess of Ripon)—whom I am pleased to see here to-night—in 1882 said that the measure then put forward was chiefly designed as an instrument of political principle and popular education. Those are the doctrines announced by the noble marquess opposite and by my noble friend behind, and that is the point of view from which we approach the position.

I believe that the House will be satisfied—as I confess I am—with the amount of patience which has been bestowed upon the preparation of the scheme in India, and I hope I may add that it has been treated with equal patience and candour here with us. The result is that although some points of difficulty arose, and though the Government of India decided to drop certain parts of the scheme, on the whole there has been complete and remarkable agreement between the Government of India and myself as to the best way of dealing with these proceedings in the Legislative Council.

What you are to consider to-day will open up a great chapter in the history of India. This is the list of powers we shall have to take from Parliament when we

bring in this Bill, which I propose to do next year :—

1. At present the maximum and minimum number of the Legislative Council is fixed by statute, and we shall come to Parliament to authorise an increase in the number both of the Viceregal and the Provincial Councils.

2. Members are now nominated by the Viceroy under the Government or the Lieutenant-Governor. No election takes place in the strict sense of the word. The nearest approach is nomination by the Viceroy on recommendation by a majority of voters on certain public bodies. We do not propose to ask Parliament to abolish nomination but we ask them to sanction election alongside of nomination, with a view to having due representation of the different classes of the country.

3. The Indian Council Act of 1892 forbids either Resolution or division in Council in financial discussions, and we shall ask Parliament to repeal this prohibition.

4. We shall propose to invest Legislative Councils with power to discuss matters of public and general importance, and to pass recommendations to the Government.

5. We propose to extend the power that at present exists to appoint a Member on the Council to preside.

6. Bombay and Madras have Executive Councils, and I propose to ask Parliament for power to double the number.

7. The Lieutenant-Governor has no Executive Council, and we shall ask Parliamentary sanction for the creation of such a Council, not exceeding two, and to define the Lieutenant-Governor's power to over-rule his Council.

THE OFFICIAL MAJORITY.

I now come to a very important point on which there may be differences of opinion, and which will, no doubt, create some controversy ; I mean the official majority on the Provincial Legislative Councils. It may be said that these Councils, if you take away the safeguard of an official majority, will pass all manner of wild-cat Bills. The answer to that is that the Governor-General can withhold his assent. That is not a defunct authority, but a living power, and has been used with the happiest results by the Governor-General in the case of a legislative mistake in a local Legislative Council since I have been in office. It should be remembered, when thinking of wild-cat Bills, that the range of subjects within the sphere of Provincial Legislature is rigorously limited by statutory exclusions, though more than one subject of first importance still remains. There is one proviso in the matter of the provincial majority which may, perhaps, be regarded as a surprise. I do not propose to dispense with the official majority in the Viceroy's Legislative Council. We lag behind a stage in this respect, for you will find the Government of India saying :—

“On all ordinary occasions we are ready to dispense with an official majority in the Imperial Legislative

Council, and to rely on the public spirit of non-official members to enable us to carry on the ordinary work of legislation."

If I were endeavouring to set up a Parliamentary system in India, it would be the easiest thing in the world to convict me of bad logic for not dropping the necessity of an official majority in the central as in the Provincial Councils. If it could be said that what I propose would lead directly up to the establishment of the Parliamentary system in India, I, for one, would have nothing at all to do with it. I do not believe it will, in spite of the attempts in Oriental countries at this moment—attempts which we all wish well—to set up Parliamentary Government. It is no ambition of mine to have any share in the beginning of that operation. (Cheers.) If I know that my days, either official or corporeal, were twenty times longer than they are likely to be, I should be sorry to set out for the goal of a Parliamentary system in India. The Parliamentary system in India is not the goal to which I for one moment aspire.

THE VICEROY'S EXECUTIVE COUNCIL.

I now turn to the question of a native Member on the Viceroy's Executive Council. The absence of a native Member from that Council can no longer be defended. There is nothing to prevent the Secretary of State recommending His Majesty to appoint an Indian member to fill any vacancy, and I want to say that, if, during my retention of office, there should be a vacancy in the Viceroy's Executive Council, I should feel it my duty to tender to the King my advice that an Indian

member should be appointed. I would not do it on my own authority only. I am not fond of treading on dark and obscure ground, and here I have the absolute and full concurrence of Lord Minto himself. It was at Lord Minto's special instigation that I began to think seriously of it, and so this is how it stands : You have at this moment a Viceroy and a Secretary of State who both concur in a recommendation of this kind.

If I may be allowed to give a personal turn to these matters, I may say that I suppose Lord Minto and I have had very different experiences of life and the world, and we belong to different schools of national politics. It is rather a remarkable thing that two men differing in this way—in antecedents and so forth—should concur in this proposal. The object of it is to show that the merits of individuals are to be considered irrespective of race and colour. We need not now discuss what particular portfolio should be assigned. That will be settled by the Viceroy on the merits of the individual. A year ago I appointed two Indian gentlemen to be Members of the Secretary of State's Council, and many apprehensions reached me as to what might happen. So far those apprehensions have all been dissipated. The concord between the two Indian Members of the Council and their colleagues has been perfect ; their work has been good ; and the advantage to me to be able to talk with one or other of these two gentlemen, and so realise the Indian point of view, has been enormous. I actually feel sometimes as though I have been transported to the

streets of Calcutta. Is it not common sense? Everybody in India recognises the advantages derived from the admission of Indians to the Bench of the High Court with their intimate knowledge of the country and the conditions of the lives of the people. I propose at once, if Parliament agrees, to acquire powers to double the Executive Councils in Bombay and Madras, and to appoint at least one Indian member in each case. Nor shall I be backward in advancing towards similar steps as occasion may require in respect to at least four of the major provinces.

GLOOMY VIEWS UNNECESSARY.

I wish it had fallen that this chapter had been opened at a more fortunate moment, but I repeat what I said when I rose—Do not let us for a moment take a gloomy view of the situation. There is not the slightest occasion for it, and none of those who are responsible take a gloomy view. We know the difficulties, and are prepared to grapple with them and keep down mutinous opposition; and we hope to attract the good will which must, after all, be the real foundation of the prosperity and strength in India. We believe that this is so far unsapped, and we believe that the admission of Indians to a more responsible share in the Government of their country, without for a moment taking from the central power its authority, will strengthen the foundations of our position. It will require great steadiness and constant pursuit of the same objects, with the assistance, under responsible circumstances, of Indians themselves. Military strength and material strength we have in

abundance. What we still want to acquire is moral strength in guiding and controlling the people of India in the course on which time has launched them. I should like to read a few words from a speech delivered by Mr. Bright in 1858, when the Government of India Bill was in another place. What he said was this :—

“ We do not know how to leave it, and therefore let us see if we know how to govern it. Let us abandon all that system of calumny against the natives of India which has lately prevailed. Had that people not been docile, the most governable race in the world, how could you have maintained your power for 100 years? Are they not industrious, are they not intelligent, are they not, upon the evidence of the most distinguished men the Indian Service ever produced, endowed with many qualities which make them respected by all Englishmen who mix with them? I should not permit any man in my presence without rebuke to indulge in the calumnies and expressions of contempt which I have recently heard poured forth without measure upon the whole population of India. The people of India do not like us, but they would scarcely know where to turn if we left them. They are all sheep, literally without a shepherd.”

However that may be, the Government have no choice and no option. As an illustrious member of this House, Lord Macaulay, wrote :—“ We found a society in a state of decomposition, and we have undertaken the serious and stupendous process of reconstructing it.” Lord Macaulay said, “ India now is like Europe in the fifth

century." A stupendous process, indeed, but one which has gone on with marvellous success! And if we are all, according to our various lights, true to our colours, that process will go on. I am not what is commonly called an Imperialist, but so far from denying it, I most emphatically affirm that it is for us to preside over this transition from the fifth European century, in some parts, in slow stages up to the twentieth. It is for us to be the guides of people in that condition, and this duty, if conducted with humanity and sympathy and wisdom and political courage, is not only a human duty and a great national honour, but what it was called the other day—one of the most glorious tasks ever confided to any country.

LORD LANSDOWNE'S SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS.

The Marquis of Lansdowne said.—It is a long time, I venture to say, since this House has listened to a statement of such absorbing interest as that just made by the noble viscount (*cheers*), and I hope I may be permitted, in the name of those who sit by me, to congratulate him, not only upon the great eloquence which characterised his observations, but upon the directness and sincerity with which he approached the many difficult and, I may say, embarrassing questions with which he had to deal. (*cheers*.) I hope I may also congratulate him upon the fact that he was able, in spite of indisposition that we all regretted, to perform his somewhat laborious task with conspicuous success. (*Cheers*.) The noble viscount told us that voluminous papers would shortly be laid before us, and I think he suggested that in these circumstances

it would be better if we did not attempt to discuss the details of proposals which are yet hardly before us. I make no complaint of that suggestion. I think it is a suggestion which I should have ventured to make if it had not been made to us, because the noble viscount told the House that the policy he was unfolding marked the opening of a new chapter in the history of our relations with India; and when that chapter comes to us with the high authority not only of the noble viscount and of the expert advisers who surround him at the India Office, but with the authority of the Viceroy and his Council, I feel that it would indeed be rash on the part of any member of your Lordships' House, upon the spur of the moment, to offer any criticisms which might occur to him at the time, but which he might afterwards desire to modify. (*Cheers.*) Let me say in passing with what pleasure I heard that part of the noble viscount's statement in which he was able to tell us that in regard to the whole of this policy he and the Viceroy of India and his Council were at one. Any one who has had to do with Indian affairs knows what an encouragement it is to the person who represents this country at the head of the affairs of India to know that he is not only in close touch with, but loyally supported by, the Cabinet Minister who has charge of the Indian business of the Government; and that solidarity, if I may use the word, is to my mind a particularly happy omen at the present moment. I shall therefore, in these circumstances, in the few words which I am about to address to the House avoid any attempt to touch upon details, and I shall merely make

one or two observations of quite a general character which have occurred to me.

A TWOFOLD POLICY.

The policy which is indicated to us is a twofold policy. There are proposals framed with the object of repressing disorder and of suppressing crime and sedition, and there are other proposals for making and facilitating alterations in the machinery of the Government of India. I may be permitted to say that in my view each of these two sets of proposals should be considered strictly upon its own merits. It is our duty to restore a sense of security to the people of India; it is also our duty to re-adjust the machinery of the Government of India from time to time should we be clearly of opinion that the country is ripe for a change and that a change would add to the efficiency of our administration. But I believe that it would be a mistake either on the one hand to be deterred from the introduction of reforms of this kind by the fact that in certain parts of India a dangerous agitation is in progress and I think on the other hand it would be a great mistake, a mischievous mistake, to represent these great modifications of our present system of Government as a counterpoise to the present unrest, as the result of kind of transaction in which one set of proposals as it were, to be set against the other. I do not think that the treatment of the subject by the noble viscount was open in any way to the imputation that he dealt with these two proposals otherwise than I have suggested.

THE CONDITION OF INDIA.

The noble viscount gave to your Lordships some description of the present condition of India. His account of the situation was, it seems to me, eminently judicial and temperate. It was not without its solemn touches, and we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there are dark shadows in the picture. But on the other hand he told us with confidence that the general condition of the country was sound ; and I hope that we may take it from him that in his opinion these disorders, however dangerous, are of a local character, and we need not assume that the whole country is honeycombed by the kind of organisations and conspiracies which are unfortunately prevalent in some parts of India. (*Cheers.*) There is another consideration which seems to me to be satisfactory. As far as I am aware it is not alleged that these disorders are in any way due to a general dissatisfaction with British rule or with the feeling that those who represent us in that country are harsh, oppressive, and unjust in their treatment of the natives of India. I believe myself that these Indians who think at all about these things are perfectly aware that our treatment of them has been not only just, but generous and that the withdrawal or disappearance of our rule would bring about chaos and calamity from which all races and all parts of the country would suffer. (*Hear, hear.*) There is yet another consideration to be noticed at the present time. These disorders seem to be the result of some unhappy operation of Western ideas of the most mischievous and dangerous type oper-

ating on the minds of an ignorant and impulsive population. It is like the case of some of those diseases which assume a peculiarly virulent type when introduced into new countries. In the same manner these Western ideas of the worst description have acquired in certain parts of India a virulence which they do not possess in any other part of the world. It seems to me that the noble viscount established clearly that there was a case for special legislation designed to strengthen the hands of the Government in India against those who are responsible for these proceedings.

THE SEDITIONOUS INDIAN PRESS.

We have seen in the Press this morning an account of the new repressive measure introduced in the Viceroy's Council. I did not catch quite clearly from the noble viscount whether that measure is specially directed against abuses on the part of Indian Press; but I take it that offences committed by the Press, if they come within the general scope and purview of the Bill, will be dealt with as in the case of other offences committed against order. I feel very strongly that it is necessary to strengthen the hands of the Government of India against the seditious Press of that country. (*Hear, hear.*) To my mind, although the person who wreaks his own petty vengeance or spite by blowing up a number of his fellow-citizens with dynamite is a great criminal, I am not sure that the man is not a greater criminal still who by the distribution of seditious literature excites people to crime which he, perhaps, himself has not the courage to commit. (*Cheers.*) I hope that

I shall not be supposed to favour anything which can be described as interference with the liberty of the Press. The Indian Press enjoys a full measure of liberty already, and no one has ever desired to deprive it of that full measure of liberty. I mean by this that the Indian newspaper is perfectly free, and should in my opinion remain perfectly free, to criticise if it likes the abuses of the Government of the country, but it should not be left free to incite to sedition and to recommend the perpetration of crimes. (*Cheers.*) There is no analogy between the Press in this country and the Indian Press. In this country the best antidote to the errors of the Press is to be found in the Press itself. A gross misstatement of a criminal libel is detected in this country by the Press. It is exposed; but only those who know India are able to say how utterly unscrupulous are the writers of these miserable publications and how absurdly credulous are those who read them. (*Hear, hear.*) I will not attempt this evening, therefore, to discuss the details of the present measures proposed by the Government of India. I will only say that it seems to me that they ought to take these features. In the first place, a strong Court, commanding general public respect; and, in the next place, so contrived as to avoid dilatory proceedings, while the penalties to be imposed should be of a sufficiently deterrent character. Measures of this kind seem to me to be taken not a moment too soon, and they are not a bit too strong. We owe these precautionary measures to those able and devoted men who are

carrying on the administration of the Indian Empire for us. We owe them not less to the devoted women who share their risks and anxieties, and we owe them, not less and not least to those—if I may use the language of the noble viscount—"dim masses of the people of India" whom we endeavour to protect against famine and against pestilence and whom it is our duty to protect also against the still more dangerous contingency to which they are now exposed. (*Cheers.*) I pass for a moment to the proposals which have reference to the machinery of the Government of India. The noble viscount was perfectly correct when he pointed out that this policy was not a new policy, but the extension of an old policy—a policy which, far from being forced on the Government of India has been adopted by them readily, willingly, and of their own accord, in the hope of educating the people of the country to a better sense of their responsibility, and also in the hope if possible, of lightening the heavy burden which falls on the shoulders of a necessarily very much centralised Government. The last step was taken, the noble Lord told the House, when I had some connection with the affairs of India; and I say unhesitatingly that those with whom I was associated at that time, if they had been asked whether what we then recommended was to be regarded as a final arrangement never to be hereafter modified, would have answered the question in the negative. The changes made in 1892, I believe, have worked on the whole well; and I do not think that any dissentient voice was raised when, in the Imperial Address to the Princes and people of India,

published not long ago in the name of His Majesty, it was announced that the time had come when in the judgment of the Viceroy and his councillors, the principle of representative institutions might be prudently extended. Therefore I approach that part of the scheme not only with an open mind but with a mind predisposed in its favour. I will, however, venture to enter two reservations.

THE PRINCIPLE OF REPRESENTATION.

In the first place, although I am sure that in dealing with these bodies it is desirable to introduce so far as circumstances permit the principle of representation, I am not by any means convinced that it is wise to rely too much upon the principle of election as we understand it here, and unless I misunderstood what fell from the noble viscount, I gathered that in this case he did not intend to proceed upon popular election pure and simple, but upon something more in the nature of an extension of the present law under which Members of the Councils and recommended by constituencies of different kinds nominated but not absolutely elected in the sense that a Member of the House of Commons is elected in this country by his constituents.

Lord Morley of Blackburn :—We do propose—not over the whole field—but we do propose the substitution of election in a large degree for the old process of recommendation.

The Marquis of Lansdowne.—I promised I would endeavour not to discuss details, and I ought not to follow that further, but I am glad to have elicited the noble vis-

count's explanation. I will only say this, that in my belief popular election in India is really an exotic idea. It is an idea which we ourselves introduced into the country. We did it cautiously and tentatively. I do not think those who know the country best will tell you that it has been an unqualified success, or that it is greatly appreciated where it has been introduced. The other reservation which I should like to make is this. As to the functions of these Legislative Councils, I am inclined to say by all means let us give them the fullest possible measure of opportunity for criticism, consultation, deliberation, interpellation, and so forth, but I think we must be extremely careful how we do anything which might have the result of paralysing the Executive Government. The noble viscount himself pointed out how widely different were the circumstances of the Opposition in this country and the Opposition so-called in India. The Opposition in this country criticise the Government with the feeling at the back of its mind that a time may come when it changes place with the Government and when it will have to incur the responsibility which rests for the moment with the Government. But you can never allow the Indian Opposition to turn the Government out, and therefore the two cases really are fundamentally different.

INDIANS IN THE VICEROY'S COUNCIL.

I heard with some satisfaction the announcement that although there was to be an unofficial majority in the Provincial Councils, the noble viscount intended at present that the official majority should remain in the Viceroy's Council. That seems to be a wise proposal, the

more so because it accords with what seems to me the sound principle in all these cases—namely, that you should work upwards from the bottom and make your reforms in the Municipal assemblies and in the provincial bodies rather than in the body which is entrusted with the high political affairs of the Indian Empire. Only one word more. The noble viscount announced that it was intended to extend the Executive Councils to other Provinces, that it was intended to add native Members to them, and that it was in contemplation to take the first opportunity of adding a native Member to the Council of the Viceroy. I will reserve what I have to say upon these questions until some other occasion. I will only venture to say that the proposal is—and the noble viscount evidently feels it is—a tremendous innovation, and I confess I should have thought it was an innovation which, whatever the technical legal rights of the case may be, ought not to be introduced until Parliament had had full opportunity of discussing the Government scheme in all its completeness. (*Cheers.*) The noble viscount admitted frankly that there were arguments on the other side, and I should have hoped that he would have listened to these arguments before anything was proposed. The noble viscount dwelt on the advantage of having on the Viceroy's Council a member who knows the country. I should like to ask what country? There are a great many countries in India. If the noble viscount has discovered a gentleman who can speak authoritatively on behalf of all the different races and creeds concerned I should say by all means give him a

place on the Viceroy's Council. The subject is one of such interest that I have slightly transgressed the limits I had proposed for my own guidance. I will add nothing more except to say—and I am sure the noble viscount will believe I say it with my whole heart—that it is my desire to support him so far as I can in a judicious extension of the reform of our Indian institutions, and that it is no less my desire to do—what I am sure it is the desire of those who sit behind me to do—what we can to support and encourage the Government of India, who have, I venture to think, met a very critical situation with a courage and self-restraint for which they deserve infinite credit. (Cheers.)

LORD MACDONNELL'S SPEECH.

Lord MacDonnell said that broadly speaking he was in warm sympathy with the policy of the Secretary of State, believing it to be bold, courageous, and, in the circumstances, statesmanlike and prudent. But he completely differed with the noble viscount's remarks with regard to the Executive Council. The principle which, in his opinion, ought to direct and control our policy in India was this—the maintenance of complete and absolute control in the hands of a small body of picked officers of the Empire who formed the Government of India, and subject to that control, the fullest measure of local Government in the Provinces that each Province was fit to administer. He believed they could not find in India a single individual who would be able to give valuable advice and assistance to the Governor-General in Council. He was also certain that they

could not appoint a Mahomedan to that Council without also appointing a Hindu ; and if they did appoint such an Officer, and he were not of the class against whom legislation of which they had heard was directed, he would command no influence whatever amongst his co-religionists. He was glad to learn that the official majority was still to be preserved in the Legislative Council of the Viceroy. If the Councils of the local Governments were enlarged and large functions conferred upon them the business which would fall upon the Council of the Viceroy would transcend local interests ; it would be connected with high Imperial affairs and with the disposals of those matters on which racial quarrels and religious difficulties arose. Consequently the Council would hold the position of arbitrator and the same complete authority should be retained by the Governor-General in his Council as should be retained by him in his executive authority. In regard to the local governments he was glad to learn that the Executive Councils of Madras and Bombay were to be enlarged ; and thought the time had come for withdrawing the official majority in local Councils. But if that was granted, then the power of the Lieutenant-Governor or of the Governor of the province should be increased so that he in the ultimate result might be able to check any shortcoming on the part of his Council which might transpire. In addition to Madras and Bombay, the noble Viscount proposed to give Councils to two Lieutenant-Governorships and subsequently two more. He presumed that one Council would be immediately given to

Bengal, as it now existed, and another probably to the United Provinces. The principle which should direct their policy in this respect was to give a larger measure of local government to provinces as they became fitted for it. (Cheers.) In his opinion, the Lieutenant-Governorship of Bengal, as it at present existed, was not fit for a Council. To give a Council to that province and to place it on an equality with Madras and Bombay was to court defeat. But if the wide and statesmanlike proposals of the noble Viscount had been put forward four years ago, he would have had no difficulty in finding a province which would have satisfied all his requirements. The most advanced and forward province in India, whether they regarded it from the point of view of material prosperity or of education, was Bengal proper. The idea of giving a council to Bengal proper was not a matter of to-day or yesterday but had been a common place of Indian administrative thought for more than half a century. A change had, however, been introduced by the partition of Bengal. The partition of Bengal was, in his mature opinion, the greatest blunder which had been committed in India since Clive conquered at Plassey. If that partition could now be undone in the large consideration of the Indian question the noble Viscount would have in Bengal a field on which his policy would take root, and the result would be the removal of all the difficulties which now confronted them. In his opinion those difficulties were nothing more than the outcome of that administrative blunder which had driven the best of the young men in

Bengal back. He said with all the authority of his long experience in India that this was a blunder, and if they did not retract and correct it the great scheme of reform which had been launched that night would fail of the success which it ought to command. It had been said that to go back on a mistake in India was to encourage the enemy. Speaking as the result of his administrative experience he said that the correction of a mistake had never been a bad thing for the Government of India or for the people of India. He congratulated the noble Viscount on having produced a scheme which would be of the utmost benefit to India.

The subject then dropped.



STATEMENT
BY
MR. BUCHANAN IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Mr. Buchanan then proceeded to make his statement. He said that the proposals of which he had to give a summary had been delayed much longer than had been anticipated, and no one regretted the delay more than the Secretary of State. But it had this justification. His noble friend was anxious, and rightly anxious, to draw information and suggestions from the widest possible area of opinion in India, official and non-official, corporate and individual, British and Indian, in all grades and from all classes, and Blue-books to be issued in a day or two would show that he had not failed in that part of his duty. His noble friend thought that the widest consultation of opinion was the best means of securing, as he trusted he would secure, the general consent and the hearty co-operation of all sections of the community. (Hear, hear.) He wanted clearly and emphatically to state that the Viceroy and the Government of India were entirely with the Government at Home, and no one could have been more actively helpful all through than Lord Minto. (Hear, hear.) He it was who, more than two years ago, initiated Constitutional reforms, and it was largely due to his patience and per-

sistence, to his tact and his liberal-mindedness, that they had been brought into a final and finished form. Ever since the Government of India was taken over by the Crown 50 years ago our aim had been gradually to associate the Indians in various ways and in varying degrees in the administration and government of the country. He was now, however, concerned with the future, not the past, and he would only say this, that just as the Indian Councils Act of 1861 marked the first step in this constitutional development, followed by another Act in 1892, so he hoped that the Act of 1909 when passed would mark a further and notable advance along the same road. (Hear, hear.)

It was not proposed to establish Advisory Councils either Imperial or Provincial. The functions to be discharged by them would be better discharged, in their judgment, by the enlarged Legislative Councils. This, of course, did not imply any abandonment of the present useful practice of informally consulting leading men on matters of public importance.

THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS.

Beginning with the Provincial Councils, he stated that there was a general increase in numbers all round, the members being generally divided into "official" and "non-official" members. They had determined to dispense with the necessity of maintaining an official majority on the Provincial Councils. (Hear, hear.) This would give greater reality to the debates and business of these assemblies. And if there were those who might be doubtful as to possible risks, he reminded them that the legis-

lative powers of Provincial Councils were by law restricted to a limited field, and there was both the veto of the Governor and the general power of the Viceroy's Council behind. There would still be, as at present, non-official members nominated to represent special interests or minorities, or experts. The corporations of the Presidency towns, the Universities, and the Chambers of Commerce would return representatives. They intend to secure a representation of the landholding class, the Mahomedans, and the planting community in certain Provinces, and there would be a large increase in the number of members elected to the Councils by the Municipalities and District Boards. For instance, in Bengal there were at present three elected members; in future there would be eight. In the United Provinces now there were four; in future there would be ten. The number of the Viceroy's Legislative Council would also be increased from twenty-four to sixty-two, excluding the Viceroy in both cases. But here they should maintain a permanent official majority. They should largely increase, from four to twelve, the elected representatives of the Viceroy's Council from the Provincial Legislative Councils. They should endeavour to provide special representation of landholders and Mahomedans from various provinces, and they should increase the representation of Chambers of Commerce and the Indian commercial community. They wanted to minimise nomination as much as possible, and to avoid creating special electorates if they could. Anyhow, they had made suggestions to the Government of India to the effect that it might be


possible to devise a system of electoral Colleges by which in the more advanced Provinces the Mahomedans, landholders, and other special communities might obtain their representation on the Councils in proportion to their numbers and importance without the creation of special electorates. It would be clearly seen what the aim was. They recognised that there were special communities and interests which should and must get representation on the Councils, and they wanted to secure it for them in the least invidious way and the way most acceptable to themselves. Coming to the question of the enlargement of the powers of the Councils, both provincial and Imperial, he said opinion was unanimous that the facilities for debate should now be extended, and this was accordingly proposed to be done, the full details being set out in the Despatch of the Government of India.

ADVANCING LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT.

Their work would be incomplete, however, if they did not go lower down in the scale of administration and Government than the Provincial Councils. They wanted to make an effective advance in the direction of local self-government, and to do something to vivify and make popular the constitution and functions of the Local and District Boards and other minor boards in the country. The object was to train the people of the towns and Districts of British India to manage their own local affairs intelligently and successfully, and in the opinion of the Government, the control of Government in this department of administration should be exercised from without rather than from within. (Hear, hear.) The Govern-

ment should revise and check the acts of the local bodies and not dictate them. The work of Lieutenant-Governors of the large Provinces other than Madras and Bombay had largely increased, and the Government believed it might lead to greater efficiency if in certain cases they were assisted by Executive Councils. They did not intend immediately to give every Lieutenant-Governor an Executive Council, but they proposed to take Parliamentary powers for the purpose at once. They also proposed to add to the numbers of the Executive Councils in Madras and Bombay either one or two additional members, and one of these they thought should in practice be an Indian. Some of the proposals adumbrated could be brought into operation at once, some would need legislation in India, and some would need legislation here. A Bill would be introduced in Parliament early next Session. The proposals were a real step forward, and went a long way to meet, in Lord Minto's words, the "political aspirations of honest reformers." They were intended to associate a much larger body of Indians in the work of Government, to throw greater responsibility upon them both in the higher and in the lower ranges of Government, to maintain British supremacy clear and unchallenged at the top, but to endeavour to secure that under our guiding, directing and restraining hand the Indians should learn the work of administration and government in the only school worth anything—the school of experience. (Hear, hear.) He ventured to appeal to members of all parties, to men of good-will outside and inside the House, both here and in India. Some

might object to one detail of these reforms, and some to another, but, after all, this was an important moment in the relations between this country and India. Let them try to make it a golden moment. (Cheers.) Let them endeavour to give these proposals a start, and a fair start in India. Let them go to that country as the spontaneous and gratuitous proposals of the British nation to the populations of India. There was a fine saying of the great Englishman the tercentenary of whose birth they had just been celebrating, in which Milton said, "Let England never forget her precedence of teaching nations how to live." We Englishmen, Scotchmen, and Irishmen were now face to face with probably the greatest and most difficult problem of Government with which our race had ever had to contend, and he believed, for his part, that if we possessed a good heart, a clear head, a right mind, and quiet courage, we should not fail. (Cheers.)



SCHEDULE I.—IMPERIAL EXISTING.

EX-OFFICIO.

The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal (or of the Punjab when the Council assembles in Simla), the Commander-in-Chief and the Members of the Executive Council ... 8

ADDITIONAL.

A.—Nominated members ; not more than 6 to be officials ; the non-officials to be nominated with reference to legislative business or to represent interests ... 11

B.—Elected members — ... 5

(a) by the Legislative Councils of Madras, Bombay, Bengal and the United Provinces ... 4

(b) by the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce. 1

Total ... 24

or, including His Excellency the Viceroy ... 25

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.

PROPOSED.

EX-OFFICIO.

The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal (or of the Punjab when the Council assembles in Simla), the Commander-in-Chief and the members of the Executive Council	8
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ADDITIONAL.

A.—Officials representing provinces	8
B.—Nominated members; not more than 15 to be officials; the non-officials to be representatives of minorities or special interests, or experts	18
*C.—Elected members—	28

†(a) by the Provincial Legislative Councils and by the Advisory Council of the Central Provinces ... 12

(b) by the landholders of Madras, Bombay, Bengal, Eastern Bengal and Assam, the United Provinces, the Punjab and the Central Provinces ... 7

(c) by Muhammadans of Bengal, Eastern Bengal and Assam, the United Provinces, the Punjab and (alternately) Madras and Bombay ... 5

(d) by Chambers of Commerce of Calcutta and Bombay ... 2

‡(e) by representatives of Indian commerce. 2--

Total ... 62

or, including His Excellency the Viceroy ... 63

* Some of these may at first have to be nominated, pending the formation of suitable electorates, but the intention is that all should eventually be elected, so far as may be practicable.

† Legislative Councils of Madras 2, Bombay 2, Bengal 2, United Provinces 2, Punjab 1, Burma 1, Eastern Bengal and Assam 1, and Provincial Advisory Council of Central Provinces 1.

‡ To be nominated by the Governor-General in consultation with local Governments until a method of election can be devised.

PROVINCIAL LEGIS
MADRAS.—EXISTING.

EX-OFFICIO.

Members of the Executive Council	2
Advocate-General	1

ADDITIONAL.

A.—Nominated members; not more than 9 to be officials; the non-officials to represent different classes, one ordinarily to be a zamindar paying not less than Rs. 20,000 <i>peshkash</i> annually				13
B.—Elected members—				7
(a) by Corporation of Madras				1
(b) by Municipalities and District Boards.				4
(c) by the University				1
(d) by the Chamber of Commerce, or other commercial bodies				1
				Total			23
or, including the Governor				24

LATIVE COUNCILS.

MADRAS.—PROPOSED.

EX-OFFICIO.

Members of the Executive Council	2
Advocate-General	1

ADDITIONAL.

A.—Nominated members; not more than 20 to be officials: the non-officials to be representatives of special interests or minorities, or experts	24
B.—Elected members—	19
(a) by Corporation of Madras	1
*(b) by Municipalities and District Boards.	8
(c) by the University	1
†(d) by landholders	4
(e) by the planting community	1
‡(f) by Muhammadans	2
(g) by the Chamber of Commerce	1
(h) by the Indian commercial community.	1

Total ... 46

or, including the Governor ... 47

* Voting together in eight groups of about three districts each.

† Voting in four groups of about six districts each.

‡ Elected or nominated as may be found practicable.

BOMBAY.—EXISTING.

EX-OFFICIO.

Members of the Executive Council	2
Advocate-General	1

ADDITIONAL.

A.—Nominated members; not more than 9 to be officials; the non-officials to represent different classes of the community	...	12
B.—Elected members—	...	8
(a) by Corporation of Bombay	...	1
(b) by Municipalities	...	1
(c) by District Boards*	...	2
(d) by Bombay University	...	1
(e) by Sardars of the Deccan and Zamindars of Sind	...	2
(f) by Bombay Chamber of Commerce, or other commercial bodies	...	1—
	Total	23
or, including the Governor	...	24

* Voting by electoral representatives on a population scale.

BENGAL.—EXISTING.

A.—Nominated members; not more than 10 to be officials; the non-officials to represent different classes of the community	...	13
B.—Elected members	...	7
(a) by Corporation of Calcutta	...	1
(b) by Municipalities (by rotation)	...	1
(c) by District Boards (by rotation)	...	2
(d) by the University	...	1
(e) by Landholders' Associations	...	1
(f) by Chamber of Commerce or other Commercial bodies	...	1
	Total	20
or, including the Lieutenant-Governor	...	21

BOMBAY.—PROPOSED.**EX-OFFICIO.**

Members of the Executive Council...	2
Advocate-General	1

ADDITIONAL.

A.—Nominated members ; not more than 20 to be officials : the non-officials to be representatives of special interests or minorities, or experts				23
B.—Elected members—				20
(a) by Corporation of Bombay	1	
(b) by Municipalities	4	
(c) by District Boards	4	
(d) by the University	1	
(e) by landholders	3	
(f) by Muhammadans	3	
(g) by Bombay Chamber of Commerce	1	
(h) by Karachi Chamber of Commerce	1	
(i) by Millowners' Associations of Bombay and Ahmedabad alternately	1	
(j) by Indian commercial community	1—	
		Total	...	46
or, including the Governor				47

BENGAL.—PROPOSED.

A.—Nominated members ; not more than 23 to be officials ; the non-officials to be representatives of special interests or minorities, or experts				26
B.—Elected members—				20
(a) by Corporation of Calcutta	1	
(b) by Municipalities	4	
(c) by District Boards	4	
(d) by the University	1	
(e) by landholders	4	
(f) by the planting community	1	
(g) by Muhammadans	2	
(h) by the Chamber of Commerce	1	
(i) by the Calcutta Trades' Association	1	
(j) by the Indian commercial community.	1 —	
		Total	...	46
or, including the Lieutenant-Governor				47

UNITED PROVINCES.—EXISTING.

A.—Nominated members ; not more than 7 to be officials ; the non-officials to represent different classes of the community. ...	9
B.—Elected members—	6
(a) by groups of Municipalities	2
(b) by groups of District Boards	2
(c) by University of Allahabad	1
(d) by Upper India Chamber of Commerce or other commercial bodies	1
Total	15
or, including the Lieutenant-Governor	16

EASTERN BENGAL & ASSAM.—EXISTING.

A.—Nominated members ; not more than 7 to be officials ; the non-officials to represent different classes of the community	9
B.—Elected members	6
(a) by Municipalities and District Boards	3
(b) by Associations of landholders..	1
(c) by Associations of merchants	1
(d) by Commissioners of Port of Chittagong	1
Total	15
or, including the Lieutenant-Governor	16

UNITED PROVINCES.—PROPOSED.

A.—Nominated members ; not more than 23 to be officials ; the non-officials to be representatives of special interests or minorities, or experts				27
B.—Elected members—				19
(a) by large Municipalities				2
(b) by District Boards and smaller Municipalities				8
(c) by Allahabad University				1
(d) by landholders				2
(e) by Muhammadans				4
(f) by Upper India Chamber of Commerce				1
(g) by the Indian commercial community. 1				1
Total				46
or, including the Lieutenant-Governor				47

EASTERN BENGAL & ASSAM.—PROPOSED.

A.—Nominated members ; not more than 18 to be officials ; the non-officials to be representatives of special interests or minorities, or experts				21
B.—Elected members—				15
* (a) by Municipalities and District and Local Boards				8
(b) by landholders				2
(c) by Muhammadans				2
(d) by tea interest				1
(e) by jute interest				1
(f) by Commissioners of Port of Chittagong				1
Total				36
or, including the Lieutenant-Governor				37

* Voting together by divisions, viz., Dacca 2, Chittagong 2, Rajshahi 2, Brahmaputra valley 1, Surma valley 1.

PUNJAB.—EXISTING.

A.—Nominated members :—

Officials	4
Non-officials	5
						—
Total						9
or, including the Lieutenant-Governor						10
						—

BURMA.—EXISTING.

A.—Nominated members :—

Officials	5
Non-officials	4
						—
Total						9
or, including the Lieutenant-Governor						10
						—

PUNJAB.—PROPOSED.

A.—Nominated members; not more than 12 to be officials, the non-officials to represent Muhammadans, Hindus, Sikhs and other interests	19
B.—Elected members—	5
(a) by the commercial community	1
(b) by the Punjab University	1
(c) by the larger cities	3
						—
				Total	...	24
or, including the Lieutenant-Governor	25
						—

BURMA.—PROPOSED.

A.—Nominated officials	8
B.—Nominated non-officials	7
(a) to represent Burmese population	4
(b) to represent Indian and Chinese commercial communities	2
(c) to represent other interests	1
C.—Elected by Burma Chamber of Commerce...	1
						—
				Total	...	16
or, including the Lieutenant-Governor	17
						—

SCHEDULE II.—A.—*The Imperial Budget.*

REVENUE.		EXPENDITURE.	
Heads for debate.	Heads excluded from debate.	Heads for debate.	Heads excluded from debate.
I. Land Revenue.	IV. Stamps.	1. Refunds and Drawbacks.	2. Assignments and Compensations.
II. Opium.	VII. Customs.	3. Land Revenue.	13. Interest on Debt.
III. Salt.	VIII. Assessed Taxes.	4. Opium.	23. Ecclesiastical.
V. Excise.	XI. Tributes from Native States.	5. Salt.	25. Political.
VI. Provincial Rates.	XVI-A. Courts of Law.*	6. Stamps.	27. Territorial and Political Pensions.
IX. Forest.	XXXII. Army.	7. Excise.	38. State Railways.†
X. Registration.	XXXIII. Marine.	8. Provincial Rates.	42. Major Works : Interest on Debt.
XII. Interest.	XXXIV. Military Works.	9. Customs.	46. Army.
XIII. Post Office.	All purely Provincial revenue.	10. Assessed Taxes.	46-A. Marine.
XIV. Telegraph.		11. Forest.	47. Military Works.
XV. Mint.		12. Registration.	47-A. Special Defences.
XVI-B. Jails.		14. Interest on other Obligations.	All Statutory charges.
XVII. Police.		15. Post Office.	All purely Provincial expenditure.
XIX. Education.		16. Telegraph.	
XX. Medical.		17. Mint.	
XXI. Scientific and other Minor Departments.		18. General Administration.†	
		19-A. Courts of Law.†	
		19-B. Jails.	

XXII. Receipts in aid of Superannuation.	20. Police.
XXIII. Stationery and Printing.	22. Education.
XXIV. Exchange.	24. Medical.
XXV. Miscellaneous.	26. Scientific and other Minor Departments.
XXVI. State Railways.	28. Civil furlough and Absentee Allowances.
XXVII. Guaranteed Companies.	29. Superannuation Allowances and Pensions.
XXVIII. Subsidized Companies.	30. Stationery and Printing.
XXIX. Irrigation Major Works.	32. Miscellaneous.
XXX. Minor Works and Navigation.	33. Famine Relief.
XXXI. Civil Works.	34. Construction of Protective Railways.
	35. Construction of Protective Irrigation Works.
	36. Reduction or Avoidance of Debt.

* Mainly Court-fees and fines.

+ These heads include certain statutory charges, which will be excluded from debate.

† This head deals purely with interest, sinking funds and annuities.

SCHEDULE II.—A.—The Imperial Budget.—continued.

REVENUE.		EXPENDITURE.	
Heads for debate.	Heads excluded from debate.	Heads for debate.	Heads excluded from debate.
		39. Guaranteed Companies.	
		40. Subsidized Companies.	
		41. Miscellaneous Railway Expenditure.	
		42. Irrigation Major Works — Working Expenses.	
		43. Minor Works and Navigation.	
		45. Civil Works.	
		48. State Railways Capital Expenditure not charged to revenue.	
		49. Irrigation Works:	
		do. do. do.	

B.—The Provincial Budget.

REVENUE.		EXPENDITURE.	
Heads for debate.	Heads excluded from debate.	Heads for debate.	Heads excluded from debate.
I. Land Revenue. V. Excise. IX. Forest. X. Registration. XII. Interest. XVI-B. Jails. XVII. Police. XVIII. Ports and Pilotage. XIX. Education. XX. Medical. XXI. Scientific and other Minor Departments. XXII. Receipts in aid of Superannuation, etc.	IV. Stamps. VI. Provincial Rates. VIII. Assessed Taxes. XVI-A. Courts of Law.* XXVI. State Railways. All purely Imperial revenue.†	1. Refunds and Drawbacks. 3. Land Revenue. 6. Stamps. 7. Excise. 8. Provincial Rates. 10. Assessed Taxes. 11. Forest. 12. Registration. 18. General Administration.‡ 19-A. Courts of Law.‡ 19-B. Jails. 20. Police. 21. Ports and Pilotage. 22. Education. 24. Medical.	2. Assignments and Compensations. 13. Interest on Debt. 25. Political. 42. Major works : Interest on debt. All Statutory Charges. All purely Imperial expenditure.§

* Mainly Court-tees and fines.

† Purely Imperial heads of account are omitted from this list—*e.g.*, II, III, XI, XIII, XIV, etc.

‡ These heads include certain statutory charges, which will be excluded from debate.

§ Purely Imperial heads of account are omitted from this list—*e.g.*, 4, 5, 9, 15, etc.

B.—The Provincial Budget.—continued.

REVENUE.		EXPENDITURE.	
Heads for debate.	Heads excluded from debate.	Heads for debate.	Heads excluded from debate.
XXIII. Stationery and Printing.		26. Scientific and other Minor Departments.	
XXV. Miscellaneous.		29. Superannuation Allowances and Pensions.	
XXIX. Irrigation Major Works.		30. Stationery & Printing	
XXX. Minor Works and Navigation.		32. Miscellaneous.	
XXXI. Civil Works.		33. Famine Relief.	
		36. Reduction or Avoidance of Debt.	
		40. Subsidized Companies.	
		41. Miscellaneous Railway expenditure.	
		42. Irrigation Major Works—Working Expenses.	
		43. Minor Works and Navigation.	
		44. Construction of Bys. charged to Provincial revenues.	
		45. Civil Works.	

SCHEDULE III.

*Amendments required in the Indian Councils**Act, 1892.*

1. In section 1, sub-section (1), the substitution for the words "ten" and "sixteen" of the words "forty" and "fifty-four," and for the words "eight" and "twenty" of the words "twenty" and "forty-three."

2. In the same section the substitution of the following for sub-section (2):

"(2) It shall be lawful for the Governor-General in Council, by proclamation, from time to time to increase the number of the Councillors whom the Lieutenant-Governors of the Provinces named below may nominate for their assistance in making laws and regulations:

Provided always that not more than the numbers specified below shall be nominated in the case of each Province:

- (i) for the Bengal Division of the Presidency of Fort William ... forty-six.
- (ii) for the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh forty-six.
- (iii) for Eastern Bengal and Assam ... thirty-six.
- (iv) for the Punjab twenty-four.
- (v) for Burma sixteen."

3. In section 2, paragraphs one and two, the insertion after the words "the discussion," in each place in which they occur, of the words "of any matter of general public interest and."

4. In the same section the substitution for paragraph three of the following paragraph:

"Any such rules as aforesaid may provide also for the appointment of any member of any such Council to preside at any such discussion in the place of the Governor-General, Governor or Lieutenant-Governor, as the case may be."

APPENDIX.

MR. GOKHALE ON THE REFORM PROPOSALS.

The following is the full text of a note submitted by the Hon. Mr. Gokhale to Viscount Morley in September last:—

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

Two Indians should be appointed to the Executive Council of the Viceroy.

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS.

Every Province in India (except Central Provinces and Berar) should now have at its head a Governor appointed from England assisted by an Executive Council of three or four Members. Where there are three Members, one of them should be an Indian, and where there are four, two should be Indians.

The Central Provinces and Berar should have a Lieutenant-Governor with a Legislative Council instead of a Chief Commissioner.

LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS.

Composition.—

In the Viceroy's Legislative Council, there should be a small majority of official and nominated Members over the elected Members. In the Provincial Legislative Councils, the elected Members should be in a majority.

The Viceroy's Council may consist, as proposed by the Government of India last year, of 55 Members. If so, it should be composed as follows:—

25 Official Members—

- 1 Viceroy.
- 1 Governor of the Province in which the Council assembles.
- 1 Commander-in-Chief.
- 6 Ordinary Members of the Viceroy's Executive Council (Law, Finance, Home, Revenue and Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, and Military Supply.)

- 7 Official representatives of the seven Provinces (Madras, Bombay, Bengal, United Provinces, Punjab, Burma and Central Provinces.)
9. Other Officials, such as Director-General of Education, Chairman of the Railway Board, etc.

25

- 5 Non-Official Members nominated by the Viceroy.
- 25 Elected Members :—
- 13 Representatives of the seven Provinces elected by Provincial Councils—(Madras, Bombay, Bengal, United Provinces, Punjab and Burma, 2 each ; Central Provinces 1.)
- 3 Representatives of landed gentry (Bengal 1, Central Provinces 1 ; and Madras and United Provinces alternately 1 ; Bombay, Punjab and Burma do not need special representation for the landed gentry.
- 5 Representatives of Industry and Commerce (Calcutta Chamber of Commerce 1 ; Bombay Chamber of Commerce 1 ; Madras and Cawnpore (U. P.) Chambers of Commerce alternately 1 ; Planters of Assam, Behar and Southern India 1 by turns ; and Bombay Millowners' Association, representing the Indian Mercantile Community 1).
- 4 Representatives of the Mahomedan Community elected by special Constituencies to be created (Bengal 1, United Provinces 1, Punjab 1, Madras and Bombay 1 alternately.)

25

A Provincial Legislative Council should consist of not less than 50 and not more than 100 Members.

Not less than half of the Members of a Provincial Council should be elected by areas as far as possible one Member for each District—or by constituencies representing the general community without distinction of class or creed ; not more than one-quarter should be elected by constituencies representing special interests ; and the remainder should be nominated by the head of the Provincial Government.

Taking the Presidency of Bombay as an illustration, I would have there a Legislative Council consisting of 60 Members composed as follows :—

30 Elected Representatives—

23 Elected by 23 Districts.

2 Bombay Corporation.

3 Karachi, Poona and Ahmedabad Municipalities,
1 each.

1 Bombay University.

1 Bombay Justices of the Peace

30

10 Representatives of special interests—

4 Elected by special Mahomedan Constituencies
(Bombay City 1, Northern, Central and
Southern Divisions, 1 each. Sind may be
expected to return at least 3 Mahomedan
Members and so no special Mahomedan
constituency is needed for Sind.)

2 Chambers of Commerce, Bombay & Karachi.

1 Millowners' Association.

1 Sardars in the Deccan.

1 Taluqdars of Guzerath.

1 Zemindars of Sind.

10

20 Members of the Executive Council and official and
and Non-official Members nominated by the
Governor.

60

Functions—

Subject to the veto of the President, a Legislative Council should have complete control over its own legislation. To meet extraordinary emergencies, the Viceroy's Legislative Council should have the reserve power to legislate in Provincial matters, after a Provincial Legislature has refused to pass such legislation.

A Provincial Government should be free to frame its own Budget of expenditure within the limits of the revenue assigned to it. Imperial and Provincial Budgets

should be settled by Budget Committees of seven Members, of whom three should be nominated by the Non-official Members of the Legislative Council. When a Budget is laid before the Legislative Council, a general discussion should first be permitted and then Members should be allowed to bring forward proposals in the form of Resolutions on which the Council should, if required by the movers, divide. The whole discussion should be subject to a time-limit (not less than three days and not more than a week.)

Members of a Legislative Council should have the power to raise administrative questions at Meetings of the Council in three ways:—(a) By interpellations as at present, supplementary questions being permitted. (b) By a motion for papers, which the Government may accept or refuse. (c) By a Resolution, if not less than one-fourth of the non-official Members submit a requisition to the President to have the Resolution considered.

No Resolutions of a Legislative Council on the Budget or on questions of administration should take effect unless they are accepted by the President.

A Provincial Legislative Council should meet at least once a month.

DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION.

District Administration should be decentralised by freeing the heads of Districts largely from the present excessive Secretariat control of Provincial Governments, and substituting in place of the control so removed the control of public opinion on the spot. For this purpose, small District Councils, partly elected and partly nominated, should be created, whom the Collectors should be bound to consult in all important matters. The powers that should be conferred on these Councils and the functions that should be assigned to them have been indicated in my Note on Decentralisation.

LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT.

MUNICIPALITIES.—These should be divided into three classes. In all towns which are the headquarters of the Imperial and Provincial Governments or in which there are other special interests, the system which at present prevails in the City of Bombay should be introduced.

In all other towns, with a population above 15,000 inhabitants, the Municipal Boards should consist wholly of elected Members. In towns with a population below 15,000, they should consist of three-fourths elected and one-fourth nominated Non-official Members. Provision should be made for the Government exercising stringent control in cases of gross inefficiency or corruption.

DISTRICT AND TALUK BOARDS.—District Boards should be three-fourths elected and one-fourth nominated (non-officials). Taluk Boards should be wholly elected. The resources at the disposal of these bodies should be materially increased.

VILLAGE PANCHAYATS.—In all villages with a population of 500 and above, a Village Panchayat should be created of five or seven Members, partly elected and partly nominated. Smaller villages may be grouped into unions or joined to larger adjoining villages. The powers and functions which may be entrusted to these Panchayats have been set forth in my Note on Decentralisation, where I have dealt with the whole question of extension of Local Self-Government in some detail.

The Hon'ble Mr. G. K. Gokhale on the Reform Proposals.

The Hon'ble Mr. G. K. GOKHALE spoke as follows in the last Madras Congress :—

MR. PRESIDENT, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,—I beg to submit for your acceptance the following Resolution :—

(a) That the following message be addressed by the Congress to Mr. A. O. Hume.

This Congress sends you its cordial greetings and congratulations. The reforms announced by Lord Morley are a partial fruition of the efforts made by the Congress during the last twenty-three years, and we are gratified to think that to you as its father and founder they must be the source of great and sincere satisfaction.

(b) The Congress offers its sincere congratulations to Sir William Wedderburn on his recent recovery from his serious illness and takes this opportunity to give expression to the unflagging zeal, devotion, love and singleness of purpose with which he has labored for the Indian cause during the last 20 years and which has been largely instrumental in securing for Congress views and representations the favourable considerations which they have received in England.

(c) This Congress desires to convey to the members of the British Committee its grateful thanks for their disinterested and strenuous services to the cause of Indian political advancement.

It has been the usual practice of this Congress year after year to record before the close of its proceedings its appreciation of the work which the British Committee has been doing for us in England. This year, however, in addition to that usual vote of thanks to the British Committee we propose to have two other Resolutions, one addressed to Mr. Hume and the other addressed to Sir William Wedderburn. As regards the Committee I do not think I need say very much. The

Committee has done during this year the same useful work that it has been doing in the past. It is true that during this year it has had to work under certain disadvantages. In the first place it was deprived of the assistance and the watchful care which it received in the past from Dhadabhai Naoroji, the foremost Indian of our time (hear, hear), the man without self and without stain, our aged chief who bears on his head the snow of years but carries in his heart the fire of youth. (Cheers.) Then, Gentlemen, Sir William Wedderburn who has been the heart and soul of the British Committee since its formation, was prevented from giving that close and personal attention to the affairs of the Committee which he gave in the past owing to serious illness, and his place as Chairman was temporarily occupied by Sir Henry Cotton, and the work of the Committee was carried on by Sir Henry and the other members as usual. Our first duty, therefore, in this Congress is to tender our thanks to the Committee for the vigour and the vigilance with which they have pushed on the Indian cause in England. Having done that, we turn to those two Englishmen, our foremost friends in England. The first clause is about Mr. Hume. Now we all know that Mr. Hume founded this Congress. (Cheers.) We all know with what loving care he watched over it in the early years of its growth, and when he was later prevented by declining health from taking the same active interest in its development in this country, we know how he worked for this movement in England. Mr. Hume's interest in this movement has continued unflagging to this day. Mr. Hume has placed his wise guidance, his sage counsel, at our disposal whenever the need for such guidance and for such counsel has arisen. During the long re-actionary period through which we have recently passed no man was more keenly disappointed over the apparent failure of the work of the Congress than Mr. Hume. No one was filled with more bitter grief and concern than Mr. Hume when last year the disaster which we all know so well overtook the Congress at Surat. I know again from personal knowledge and experience that when during the last few months anxious deliberations were going on in London in connection with the reforms just now

announced, when our prospects now appeared darker and now appeared brighter, no man was following these developments with more anxious interest than Mr. Hume, and now when the gloom seems to be dissipating and the first streaks of a new dawn are visible no one has a greater right to be gladdened than the founder and the father of the Congress. In sending this message to Mr. Hume, therefore, we are only performing what I call a filial duty. Mr. Hume is past 80, and we are happy to think that this comfort has been vouchsafed to him in the evening of his life, and we all fervently hope he will long be spared to observe and watch the progress which we hope to make in the new path.

Then the third clause is about Sir William. Sir William, as you all know, has just passed through a very serious illness and a serious illness at 76 is a very serious matter indeed. But a merciful providence has spared Sir William to us, and it is but fitting and proper that we should express our joy at his recovery on this occasion. Gentlemen, only those who have seen Sir William's work for us in England, can adequately realise how much, how very much we owe to this high-souled Englishman. During the last three years I have had to pay three visits to England in connection with this work and during all that time I was working in most intimate association with him and under his affectionate guidance; and I can lay claim to speak with some authority on this point. And I say this, that there has never been another Englishman who has laboured for us as Sir William has done. There have been great Englishmen, men occupying distinguished positions in the public life of England, who have befriended the cause of India in the past. The honoured names of Bright, Fawcett and Bradlaugh will always be cherished with love and reverence. But for them India was not the only subject occupying their time. They had other interests, they had other work, there were other claims upon their attention. With Sir William the whole thing has been different. India has been since his return twenty years ago his single interest, it has been his sole absorption, his one passion. During these twenty years, Sir William has placed at our disposal all his time, all his energies and a

large part of his own personal resources ungrudgingly. (*Cheers*). For us he has borne much; through good report and through evil report, through sunshine and through storm this high-souled Englishman has stood by us. He sought entrance into the House of Commons for our sake, he gave up a Parliamentary career when he found the demands made by his constituents inconsistent with the performance of his self-imposed task. For us he was prepared to lose caste with his countrymen in this land. He has joyed with us in our joys, he has sorrowed with us in our sorrows, he was filled with anxiety when we were anxious, but he never gave way to despair when we were all filled with despair. Now that a new morn is greeting us I am sure new friends will come to cheer us; but Sir William has kept vigil by our side during the night. I therefore propose that the best thanks of this Congress should be tendered to Sir William on this occasion because I firmly believe, and I am sure those who know how much Sir William has done will also believe, that he has been largely instrumental in pushing the Indian question to the front in England and securing for it that favourable consideration which it is receiving there to-day.

Having said so much about the personal portion of this Resolution, I will, if you will permit me, make a few observations on one sentence in the first part of this Resolution. That sentence is this. In our message to Hume we say "the reforms announced by Lord Morley are a partial fruition of the efforts made by the Congress during the last twenty-three years." I think it would not be irrelevant and it would not be inappropriate if I examine briefly how the new reforms that have been announced constitute what has been described here as a partial fruition of the efforts made by the Congress during the last twenty-three years. For this purpose you must briefly glance in the first instance at the efforts made by the Congress during the last twenty-three years, and secondly you must glance at the reforms that have been announced, taking with them the other measures which have gone before the present announcement and other measures which are likely to come in the near future.

So far as the Congress is concerned, briefly you may say that it has sought three objects during the last twenty-three years. The first may be called a social object, the Congress has sought to promote greater unity among the different elements in this country, and the Congress has sought to promote a greater feeling of nationality throughout the land. Speaking of uniting even here on this platform after the unhappy separation which we all deplore, speaking here I may say that to-day the feeling of unity in the country, taking the divergent elements of the country into consideration, is stronger, deeper and more real than it was twenty-three years ago. (Cheers). The same is true of the feeling of nationality. From one end of the country to the other there is a new impulse, a new feeling, a new vibration; and everybody who is interested in the progress of India must rejoice that that feeling of nationality is a true, a deep and a real one in the land to-day. That part however of the work of the Congress we must put aside for the present. But there were two other and those were objects we had in view, special reference to the influence we sought to exercise on the Government. One was pressing on the attention of the Government specific measures either of improvement or for the redress of grievances, numerous measures to which I am not going to make any reference just now. But the second object underlying all those measures we advocated and urged by us side by side with them, was to modify as largely as possible the bureaucratic character of the present administration. Now in some respects the most important part of the work of the Congress during these twenty-three years has been the energy expended by it on modifying the bureaucratic administration. And so far as that is concerned, I think we may fairly say that the new measures that have been announced go a long way to effect the modification. What are those measures?

I would like to glance at these measures comprehensively and then see how far this claim is justified. For that I want you to take the appointment of two Indians to the Secretary of State's Council with the reforms, also again the measures that will come next year as a result

of the Decentralisation Commission's Report—all these three hang together, they are part of one whole and what do they amount to? For that you must compare the position that we shall occupy after these reforms have come with what it was last year. You may compare the whole administration to an edifice. At the base you have rural and urban self-government; in the centre the general everyday Administration, Legislation and Finance, and at the summit you have the bodies exercising supreme power, the Executive and the Secretary of State's Council, the seat of final authority where policies are determined and important questions really settled. That being the summit and the other being the centre, and local self-government being the base, I want you to consider where we were till last year and where we shall be after these reforms are fully carried out.

So far as local self-government is concerned we have a little local self-government just now. Of course, the name is local self-government. I was for four years at the head of a Municipal Administration, we know what we possess and how much it is—I know it is not much. That is the present position so far as local self-government is concerned. Then about the centre, we have opportunities of expressing our views about Finance once a year in discussing the Budget and on Legislation whenever a new measure is in contemplation. About the general everyday administration from top to bottom there is absolutely no opportunity of placing our views in a responsible manner before those who are in authority over us. And as regards the summit, viz., those bodies where policies are determined well, we have no access to these bodies whatever to-day. Now, what will be the position under the new arrangement? At the base we shall have full control over and management of our local affairs, the fabric of local self-government started by Lord Ripon is to be carried to a proper and fitting completion—that itself is a most important thing. Local self-government has been described by many and very properly described, as a training ground, a school of political education for our people. We shall have as much scope there for political education as we choose to have. Then as regards the centre the position will be so largely modified as to

amount to almost a revolution. At the present moment in regard to administration it is all confidential reports from subordinate officers to the highest till at last the top is reached, and we know nothing till the final decision is arrived at and announced, and even if the decision is unfavourable to us or we do not like it we can only express our regret in our own way and keep still. Under the new arrangement all questions affecting everyday administration which involve matters of public importance can be brought in a responsible manner before those in authority in the Legislative Councils of the Provinces. In these Councils again a non-official majority has been provided for. This non-official majority with the power of raising administrative questions is really an exceedingly important step, and I am quite sure it will very largely modify the bureaucratic character of the existing administration. Then, in regard to Finance our control will be greater. The full extent of the control over Finance will not be realised until the larger scheme of Provincial Decentralisation is carried out, but that will be known only when orders are passed on the Decentralisation Commission's report. But it is expected, and this a matter of public knowledge, that as a result of that Commission's labour the Provincial Governments will be largely freed from the control which the Government of India exercises over them at present and in place of the control so removed the control of the Legislative Councils will be substituted—the control of discussion and criticism. Lastly as regards the seats of the highest power and authority, the Executive Councils, Indians are to be admitted to these Councils. They are already on the Secretary of State's Council, and we know what good work is being done by them there. They are to be admitted to the Indian Executive Councils, which means in formulating policies and determining large questions, racial considerations will recede in the background. The mere presence of Indians will prevent that. Again the Indian view of questions will be available there, and I expect nothing but good from the appointment of Indians to these Councils. Thus we shall have reasonable access to the highest seats of authority, we shall have fair opportunities of exercising influence in matters of Finance and

Administration by means of debate, and we shall have got full management of the local affairs. More than this a non-official majority in the Provincial Councils really means preventive control over Provincial Legislation. We cannot of course pass any law we please because there is the veto of the Government, but the Government cannot pass any law it pleases without our consent because we have the majority and this means, we have secured preventive control over Provincial legislation. In regard to the Supreme Legislature the position is somewhat different. But under this new scheme the Government of India will recede more and more in the background and the Provincial Government will come more to the front and loom larger in eyes, and we shall have all the opportunities we require for influencing the course of Provincial administration. There was a disposition yesterday to complain that for the Supreme Council the Secretary of State's scheme is really less favourable to us than that proposed by the Government of India, and there was also a disposition to complain that the scheme of electoral Colleges and the scheme of proportional representation would emphasise the importance of class representation too much. I think, gentlemen, in regard to both these points it would be well if you went away from the Congress with clear and definite ideas. (Hear, hear.) So far as the Supreme Council is concerned, the constitution proposed is part of a whole scheme. What the Government of India proposed was that in the 8 Councils, one Imperial and 7 Provincial, there was to be a standing official majority. In regard to the Imperial Council, owing to the long distance of Calcutta from the Provinces from which official members had to come, it was provided by the Government of India that the majority should not always be present there, but that it should be called into existence whenever it was required. For all practical purposes there, the majority was there, whereas in regard to Provincial Councils also there was to be an official majority. The Secretary of State has taken a momentous step in advance of these proposals; instead of having an official majority in all these Councils he has freed 7 Councils out of 8 from this official majority. Of course, there

must be a reserve of power kept somewhere, because, at the present stage of our progress, it is not reasonable to expect that the British Government will give control over Legislation and Administration to us. But by concentrating an official majority in the Supreme Council, Provincial Legislatures have all been freed from the shackles of official majority. And in so far as the Government of India will recede into the background and as this official majority there is mainly a reserve power, as practical men we should be satisfied with the scheme. We must gratefully accept this scheme as it stands, because it must be accepted or rejected as a whole.

Then about the Electoral Colleges and the representation of class interests, it is all very well to say that the end we have in view is absolute unity in the country, union among all different elements. We have many other ends in view in life, and the followers of a certain religion expect the millennium one day, but we have to deal with the existing facts as they are. There are acute class differences in the country to-day, and any scheme of representation which secures to important classes proper representation by means of election, representation by men in whom they have confidence, any scheme of this description which secures this really, in my opinion promotes the true interest of unity in the country; it removes the causes of bickering, the sourness of feeling, that otherwise would exist there. Speaking of the Mahomedan community, among whom I have most valued friends, I may say this that when this scheme is found to be working in practice—the scheme of proportional representation, and when they find themselves adequately represented by men elected by themselves and having their confidence, they will be disabused of a certain fear which they have unjustly entertained, namely, that they would be swamped by Hindus and they would be encouraged to throw in their lot with us in this great National work. (Cheers). Gentlemen, I have explained in the few observations I have made how things are to-day and what our position will be when the whole of this scheme is carried into effect. I now come to a few concluding remarks.

Stated in one sentence I may describe the change thus hitherto, we have been engaged in agitation from outside; from now we shall be engaged in what might be called responsible association with the administration. It is still not control over administration, it is still not any large share of administration, but it is association and responsible association in administration. There is plenty of scope for growth here, and as we grow and discharge the responsibilities that devolve on us properly I am sure there will be progress further and further towards our having what may be called responsible administration. From agitation to responsible association and from responsible association—a long and weary step—but the step will have to come, to responsible administration. (*Cheers.*) Now these large and generous concessions which have been made by the Government and the Secretary of State must receive at our hands that response which they require. They impose upon us two responsibilities in particular; the first is that a spirit of co-operation with the Government must now be evoked amongst us instead of mere criticism of Government. The scheme will fail of its propose and will prove absolutely useless in practice if our attitude is one of constant antagonism. Therefore the first responsibility that rests upon us is that the scheme should evoke in us a spirit of co-operation with Government. The second is that the new powers should be exercised with moderation and with restraint and they should be solely used for the promotion of the interests of the masses of the people. (*Hear, hear.*) There are so many questions awaiting solution, but under the existing system somehow the officials do not find sufficient time for their proper consideration. There is the question of mass education, there is the question of sanitation, there is the question of the indebtedness of the peasantry, there is the question of technical education and so forth. I do not deny a good deal is being done, but I say much more can be done when the Government has the co-operation of the Councils. I am sure much more will be done in the future in these directions than the past. Therefore these new powers must be exercised with moderation and restraint, and they must be exercised in the interest of the masses of the people. If

this is done I really have no fear about the future. Gentlemen, let us not talk so much of that veto which Government have reserved to themselves as some of my friends have been doing. To attack the veto or to expect or hope that the veto would be done away with in the near future is not to understand constitutional government anywhere in the world. Even at present the House of Commons works under what may be called a double veto, namely the practical veto of the House of Lords and the theoretical veto of the Sovereign. They are a self-governing people, and yet they bear all the inconveniences of this double veto. Let us grow to the full bounds of the new opportunities and it will be time to enough to talk of circumscribing the veto which is vested in the Government.

One word more and I have done. We are most of us in India, Hindus, Mahomedans and Parsees, a somewhat dreamy race. Of course, the Hindus are most so. I do not deny that dreams occasionally are a source of pleasure, even if they effect nothing else. Moreover I admit the importance of dreams in shaping our aspirations for the future, but in practical matters we have to be practical men and have to remember two things. Life is not like writing on a clean slate. We have to take the words existing on the slate and add other words so as to make complete sentences and produce a harmonious meaning. Secondly, whatever you may ask for, that is not the same thing as what you will get or will be qualified to get or in practice maintain if you get. Let us therefore not go in pursuit of more idle dreams and neglect the opportunities which the present offers to us. On the manner in which we, especially the younger section of our countrymen, grow to the height of the new opportunities will depend the future of the country. None of us wants to be satisfied with the things as they are. But first we must prove that we can bear these responsibilities before we can ask for any more. I have often said, and I repeat here again, that I do not want any limits, any restrictions on the growth which should be open to our people. I want the people of our country, men and women, to be able to rise to the full height of their stature as men and women of other countries do. But our growth can only be

through the discharge of responsibilities; they must first be well discharged before we can think of further responsibilities. Ladies and Gentlemen, I thank you heartily for the manner in which you have listened to me and for the way in which you have received me.



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